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ABSTRACT	  
This	  thesis	  poses	  the	  question:	  Why	  do	  large	  nuclear	  accidents	  derail	  plans	  for	  nuclear	  
power	  in	  some	  countries	  and	  not	  others?	  It	  seeks	  to	  provide	  answers	  through	  
comparative	  analysis	  of	  two	  matched	  sets	  of	  cases	  -­‐	  comparing	  (West)	  Germany	  to	  Japan	  
and	  France	  as	  well	  as	  Spain	  to	  Ukraine	  and	  South	  Korea.	  Historical	  process	  tracing	  distills	  
out	  what	  specific	  attributes	  of	  a	  country’s	  reaction	  lead	  to	  long-­‐term	  reversals	  in	  nuclear	  
power	  plans.	  Then,	  armed	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  reversals	  come	  to	  take	  place,	  
countries	  within	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  cases	  are	  compared	  for	  the	  underlying	  differences	  
that	  cause	  variation	  among	  them.	  The	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  power	  in	  national	  party	  
politics	  stands	  out	  as	  a	  powerful	  mechanism	  determining	  the	  course	  of	  nuclear	  power	  
development	  over	  decades.	  Inconsistency	  within	  the	  nuclear	  regulatory	  system	  serves	  as	  
a	  secondary	  mechanism.	  Across	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  cases,	  two	  elements	  of	  the	  state	  
appear	  most	  important	  in	  determining	  the	  prospect	  of	  long-­‐term	  reversals	  in	  nuclear	  
power	  plans:	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  issues	  of	  energy	  import	  dependence,	  and	  
the	  level	  of	  centralization	  of	  the	  government.	  	  	  
	  
	   The	  history	  of	  nuclear	  power	  development	  is	  decidedly	  nonlinear.	  It	  is	  characterized	  by	  periods	  of	  rapid	  growth	  punctuated	  by	  abrupt	  but	  enduring	  policy	  reversals.	  In	  the	  two	  decades	  from	  1965	  to	  1985	  worldwide	  installed	  nuclear	  power	  capacity	  increased	  nearly	  fifty	  times,	  from	  around	  5,000	  MWe	  to	  around	  240,000	  MWe.1	  In	  the	  next	  two	  decades,	  from	  1985	  to	  2005,	  worldwide	  installed	  nuclear	  capacity	  increased	  by	  only	  fifty	  percent.	  Tellingly,	  such	  nonlinear	  trends	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  global	  scale.	  Individual	  countries	  show	  similar	  boom	  and	  bust	  patterns	  of	  nuclear	  power	  development.	  In	  such	  a	  system,	  changes	  are	  the	  most	  exciting	  element	  to	  study.	  	  Large-­‐scale	  nuclear	  accidents	  –	  such	  as	  Three	  Mile	  Island	  in	  1979,	  Chernobyl	  in	  1986	  and	  Fukushima	  Diiachi	  in	  2011	  –	  have	  acted	  as	  triggers	  for	  abrupt	  but	  enduring	  changes	  in	  nuclear	  power	  development	  in	  many	  countries.	  Precisely	  how	  this	  happens	  (i.e.	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  nuclear	  development	  falters)	  is	  a	  source	  of	  disagreement.	  The	  true	  puzzle,	  however,	  is	  why	  the	  same	  accidents	  cause	  flips	  in	  some	  countries	  and	  not	  others.	  For	  example,	  the	  United	  States	  entirely	  stopped	  ordering	  new	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  after	  Three	  Mile	  Island	  in	  1979,	  while	  France	  had	  no	  such	  qualms	  even	  after	  Chernobyl.	  This	  thesis	  intends	  to	  explore	  two	  aspects	  of	  this	  puzzle.	  First,	  by	  what	  mechanisms	  do	  reactions	  to	  accidents	  cause	  dramatic	  and	  enduring	  reductions	  of	  plans	  for	  nuclear	  power?	  Secondly,	  which	  attributes	  of	  the	  state	  and	  government	  determine	  whether	  those	  mechanisms	  become	  activated	  or	  not,	  in	  a	  given	  country,	  in	  response	  to	  an	  accident?	  	  The	  main	  portion	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  comparatively	  analyze	  countries	  that	  severely	  curtailed	  their	  nuclear	  power	  development	  in	  response	  to	  an	  accident	  to	  countries	  that	  did	  not,	  under	  similar	  circumstances.	  Three	  major	  nuclear	  countries	  –	  consisting	  of	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  Japan	  –	  will	  form	  one	  comparison	  group.	  Three	  countries	  with	  significant	  but	  smaller	  nuclear	  programs	  at	  the	  time	  –	  consisting	  of	  South	  Korea,	  Spain,	  and	  Ukraine	  –	  will	  form	  a	  second	  comparison	  group.	  First,	  this	  thesis	  intends	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  mechanism	  question	  through	  historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  social	  and	  political	  reactions	  that	  were	  the	  most	  relevant	  to	  nuclear	  power	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  World	  Nuclear	  Association.	  World-­‐nuclear.org	  Nuclear	  Power	  in	  the	  World	  Today	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  programs	  over	  the	  course	  of	  decades.2	  As	  a	  point	  of	  comparison,	  a	  pervasive	  conventional	  explanation	  for	  the	  sudden	  curtailment	  of	  nuclear	  power	  after	  accidents	  will	  be	  considered	  independently.	  Second,	  and	  armed	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  reversals	  come	  to	  take	  place,	  countries	  within	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  cases	  will	  be	  compared	  for	  the	  underlying	  differences	  that	  cause	  variation	  among	  them.	  Variables	  to	  be	  considered	  include:	  previous	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  power,	  economic	  dependence	  on	  imported	  fuel,	  degree	  of	  government	  centralization,	  degree	  of	  centralization	  of	  the	  nuclear	  industry,	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  ruling	  government,	  macroeconomic	  variables	  like	  gross	  domestic	  product	  per	  capita,	  interest	  rates,	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  electricity	  consumption,	  and	  level	  of	  knowledge	  about	  nuclear	  power.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Park,	  Chris	  C.	  "Chapter	  10:	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  Nuclear	  Power?"	  Chernobyl:	  The	  
Long	  Shadow.	  Abingdon,	  Oxon:	  Routledge,	  2011.	  160-­‐83.	  Print.	  Pg	  182.	  	  
Literature	  review	  	   The	  academic	  literature	  on	  nuclear	  power	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  expansive,	  but	  largely	  confined	  to	  case-­‐specific,	  discipline-­‐specific,	  and	  technical	  publications.3	  Recently,	  authors	  have	  contributed	  through	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  nuclear	  power	  programs	  and	  policy.4	  Particularly	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis	  is	  a	  small	  group	  of	  authors	  explicitly	  concerned	  with	  socio-­‐political	  aspects	  of	  nuclear	  power	  development	  across	  large	  subsets	  of	  countries.	  	  Also	  relevant	  are	  overview	  publications	  of	  the	  energy	  industry	  as	  a	  whole,	  such	  as	  The	  Quest	  by	  Daniel	  Yergin,	  and	  of	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  specifically,	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Nuclear	  Industry	  Reports.	  	  	   Technical	  publications	  about	  nuclear	  power	  and	  its	  prospects	  –	  from	  sources	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency,	  and	  the	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency	  –	  agree	  on	  several	  key	  points.	  They	  agree	  that	  technological	  issues	  are	  generally	  settled:	  “Nuclear	  power	  is	  a	  mature	  low-­‐carbon	  technology	  that	  is	  already	  available	  today	  for	  wider	  deployment.”5	  This	  includes	  areas	  that	  nonetheless	  experience	  political	  controversy,	  such	  as	  the	  management	  of	  radioactive	  waste.6	  Such	  publications	  highlight	  issues	  of	  policy,	  politics,	  public	  opinion,	  and	  financing	  as	  looming	  large	  over	  the	  future	  of	  nuclear	  power.7	  They	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  state	  participation,	  state	  support,	  and	  efficient	  regulatory	  regimes	  in	  advancing	  nuclear	  development.	  Furthermore,	  nuclear	  power	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Sovacool,	  Benjamin	  K.,	  and	  Scott	  V.	  Valentine.	  The	  National	  Politics	  of	  Nuclear	  
Power:	  Economics,	  Security	  and	  Governance.	  London:	  Routledge,	  2012.	  Print.	  Pg	  5.	  4	  Csereklyei,	  Zsuzsanna.	  "Measuring	  the	  Impact	  of	  Nuclear	  Accidents	  on	  Energy	  Policy."	  Ecological	  Economics	  (2014):	  121-­‐29.	  Elsevier.	  Web.	  10	  Feb.	  2014.	  &	  Gourley,	  Bernard,	  and	  Adam	  N.	  Stulberg.	  "Correlates	  of	  Nuclear	  Energy."	  Nuclear	  
Renaissance	  and	  International	  Security.	  By	  Adam	  Stulberg.	  N.p.:	  Stanford	  UP,	  2013.	  19-­‐49.	  Print.	  5	  OECD.	  International	  Energy	  Agency.	  Technology	  Roadmap:	  Nuclear	  Energy.	  By	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  and	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Agency.	  France:	  Corlet,	  2010.	  Print.	  Energy	  Technology	  Roadmaps.	  Pg	  3	  6	  Technology	  allowing	  for	  long-­‐term	  storage	  and	  breeder	  reactors	  is	  available	  today	  and	  generally	  considered	  sufficient	  to	  handle	  current	  and	  future	  nuclear	  waste	  issues.	  Politically,	  the	  challenge	  is	  much	  steeper.	  	  7	  Ibid.	  &	  Rosen,	  M.	  Nuclear	  Power:	  Issues	  of	  Misunderstandings.	  381-­‐388	  in	  Power	  in	  
Developing	  Countries:	  Its	  Potential	  Role	  and	  Strategies	  for	  Its	  Development.	  Bhabha	  Atomic	  Research	  Centre,	  Mumbai,	  India.	  Vienna:	  IAEA,	  2000.	  Web.	  Nov.	  2013.	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  a	  global	  integrated	  industry	  with	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  important	  transnational	  players.	  A	  review	  of	  the	  risk	  literature	  on	  nuclear	  power	  and	  electricity	  generation	  follows	  in	  the	  “Conventional	  explanation”	  section.	  	  	   Quantitative	  analysis	  has	  yielded	  some	  clear	  correlates	  of	  nuclear	  power	  development,	  broadly.	  Dependence	  on	  imported	  energy,	  gross	  domestic	  product,	  and	  a	  lock-­‐in	  effect8,	  specifically.9	  Such	  conclusions	  are	  supported	  by	  qualitative	  analysis	  from	  technical	  publications	  and	  overviews.	  Correlation	  with	  energy	  imports	  is	  unsurprising,	  as	  uranium	  is	  a	  minor	  part	  of	  the	  overall	  cost	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  needed	  infrequently	  in	  small	  quantities,	  and	  simple	  to	  store	  in	  reserve.10	  Nuclear	  power	  is	  a	  rather	  expensive	  endeavor,	  up	  front,	  and	  a	  large	  economy	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  the	  necessary	  investment.11	  High	  initial	  construction	  cost	  limit	  entry	  into	  the	  industry,	  creating	  technological	  path-­‐dependence.12	  Some	  have	  noted	  that	  the	  promise	  of	  cheap,	  consistent	  uranium	  fuel	  raises	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  nuclear	  power	  in	  times	  of	  high	  or	  volatile	  fossil	  fuel	  prices.13	  	   While	  some	  variables	  correlate	  to	  development	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  there	  is	  a	  group	  of	  authors	  explicitly	  concerned	  with	  socio-­‐political	  aspects	  of	  nuclear	  power	  development	  that	  find	  quantitative	  and	  technical	  analysis	  insufficient	  at	  describing	  the	  dramatic	  variation	  seen	  both	  over	  time	  and	  between	  countries.	  Sovacool	  and	  Valentine	  utilize	  a	  systems	  based,	  inductive	  methodology.14	  Kolb	  employs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  This	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  “countries	  which	  have	  already	  invested	  in	  nuclear	  infrastructure	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  build	  nuclear	  power	  plants.”	  [Csereklyei,	  2014.	  Pg	  127.]	  This	  variable	  is	  explainable	  in	  many	  ways,	  including	  that	  economics	  of	  scale	  and	  nuclear	  know-­‐how	  depend	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  nuclear	  program,	  and	  that	  the	  initial	  investment	  required	  is	  large.	  	  9	  The	  effects	  of	  other	  variables,	  such	  as	  regime	  type,	  economic	  growth,	  economic	  openness,	  and	  the	  presence	  military	  threats	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  	  Gourley,	  Bernard,	  and	  Adam	  N.	  Stulberg,	  2013.	  Pg	  47-­‐49.	  10	  World	  Nuclear	  Association.	  World-­‐nuclear.org.	  The	  Economics	  of	  Nuclear	  Power	  11	  Gourley,	  Bernard,	  and	  Adam	  N.	  Stulberg,	  2013.	  Pg	  34	  12	  Nikolai	  Sokov.	  Review	  of	  Stulberg,	  Adam	  N.;	  Fuhrmann,	  Matthew,	  eds.,	  The	  
Nuclear	  Renaissance	  and	  International	  Security.	  H-­‐Diplo,	  H-­‐Net	  Reviews.	  August,	  2013.	  13	  Lester,	  Richard	  K.,	  and	  Robert	  Rosner.	  "The	  Growth	  of	  Nuclear	  Power:	  Drivers	  &	  Constraints."	  Daedalus	  138.4	  (2009):	  19-­‐30.	  Web.	  Oct.	  2013.	  14	  Sovacool	  &	  Valentine,	  2012.	  Pg	  6.	  
qualitative	  comparative	  analysis	  based	  on	  Boolean	  algebra.15	  Meanwhile,	  Rüdig,	  Yergin,	  and	  World	  Nuclear	  Industry	  Reports	  rely	  on	  descriptive	  historical	  analysis.	  Each	  of	  these	  methodologies	  better	  accommodate	  variation	  in	  public	  opinion,	  regulatory	  structures,	  levels	  of	  research	  and	  development,	  and	  other	  indirect	  variables	  that	  have	  been	  highlighted	  by	  technical	  observers	  for	  some	  time.	  	  However,	  these	  authors,	  all	  of	  whom	  compare	  nuclear	  power	  development	  across	  large	  subsets	  of	  countries,	  reach	  widely	  different	  conclusions.	  Sovacool	  and	  Valentine	  identify	  six	  broad	  drivers	  that	  act	  simultaneously	  to	  enable	  nuclear	  power	  development.	  Variables	  act	  through	  affecting	  these	  drivers.16	  Kolb	  analyzes	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  anti-­‐nuclear	  movements,	  finding	  that	  sustained	  mobilization	  combined	  with	  political	  opportunity	  leads	  to	  change.	  Political	  opportunity	  was	  enhanced	  after	  Chernobyl.17	  Rüdig	  finds	  important	  differences	  between	  market	  driven	  and	  government	  driven	  nuclear	  programs,	  and	  between	  centralized	  and	  decentralized	  political	  systems.18	  He	  is	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  time-­‐relative	  nature	  of	  political	  decisions.	  Yergin	  provides	  one	  very	  clear	  argument:	  that	  accidents	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  economics	  and	  feasibility	  of	  nuclear	  power	  by	  complicating	  regulatory	  processes	  and	  requirements.19	  	   A	  crucial	  difference,	  of	  relevance	  to	  this	  thesis,	  emerges	  between	  these	  authors	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  explanations	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  nuclear	  accidents.	  Yergin,	  Rüdig,	  and	  Kolb	  seek	  to	  directly	  explain	  stagnation,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  in	  nuclear	  power	  development.	  In	  contrast,	  Sovacol	  and	  Valentine,	  along	  with	  the	  World	  Nuclear	  Industry	  Reports	  implicitly	  assume	  that	  nuclear	  power	  is	  exceedingly	  dangerous	  and	  prohibitively	  costly.	  They	  seek	  to	  explain	  why	  some	  countries	  continue	  with	  nuclear	  power	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  rational	  drive	  to	  abandon	  it.	  Due	  to	  this	  bias,	  addressed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Kolb,	  Felix.	  Protest	  and	  Opportunities:	  The	  Political	  Outcomes	  of	  Social	  Movements.	  Frankfurt:	  Campus	  Verlag,	  2007.	  Print.	  Pg	  225	  16	  Sovacool	  &	  Valentine,	  2012.	  Pg	  235.	  17	  Kolb,	  2007.	  Pg	  228,	  234-­‐237.	  18	  Rüdig,	  Wolfgang.	  Anti-­nuclear	  Movements:	  A	  World	  Survey	  of	  Opposition	  to	  Nuclear	  
Energy.	  Harlow,	  Essex:	  Longman	  Current	  Affairs,	  1990.	  Print.	  Pg	  255-­‐256.	  19	  Yergin,	  Daniel.	  The	  Quest:	  Energy,	  Security	  and	  the	  Remaking	  of	  the	  Modern	  World.	  New	  York:	  Penguin,	  2011.	  Print.	  Pg	  418.	  	  
ABRUPT	  CHANGES	  IN	  NUCLEAR	  POWER	  DEVELOPMENT	   7	  	  further	  in	  the	  “Conventional	  explanation”	  section,	  the	  conclusions	  of	  Rüdig,	  Kolb,	  and	  Yergin	  are	  of	  greater	  utility.	  	  	  
Methodology	  and	  Case	  Selection	  This	  thesis	  acknowledges	  the	  non-­‐linear	  history	  of	  nuclear	  power	  development.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  nuclear	  power,	  technological,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  variables	  interact	  so	  strongly	  that	  feedback	  loops	  dominate	  the	  overall	  picture.20	  To	  proceed	  despite	  such	  complexity,	  this	  thesis	  intends	  to	  focus	  later	  analysis	  by	  first	  shedding	  light	  on	  the	  mechanism	  question.	  Process	  tracing,	  to	  put	  it	  in	  methodological	  terms,	  will	  distill	  out	  what	  specific	  attributes	  of	  a	  country’s	  reaction	  lead	  to	  long-­‐term	  reversals	  in	  nuclear	  power	  plans.21	  As	  a	  point	  of	  comparison,	  the	  conventional	  mechanism	  used	  by	  Savacool	  &	  Valentine,	  among	  others,	  to	  explain	  the	  sudden	  curtailment	  of	  nuclear	  power	  after	  accidents	  will	  be	  considered	  independently.22	  	  Second,	  two	  groups	  of	  countries	  will	  be	  compared	  across	  previous	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  power,	  economic	  dependence	  on	  imported	  fuel,	  degree	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  For	  example,	  building	  more	  nuclear	  plants	  of	  the	  same	  type	  make	  each	  plant	  cheaper,	  safer,	  and	  more	  politically	  feasible	  to	  construct,	  simultaneously.	  Economies	  of	  scale	  allow	  for	  cheaper	  parts.	  [World	  Nuclear	  Association	  The	  Economics	  of	  
Nuclear	  Power]	  Standardized	  production	  makes	  for	  standardized	  safety	  procedures	  and	  safer	  operation.	  Massive	  mobilization	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  back	  away	  from	  the	  project,	  politically,	  and	  raises	  the	  pressure	  to	  accomplish	  the	  expansion	  efficiently.	  Improved	  economics	  then	  make	  nuclear	  power	  more	  attractive,	  cyclically.	  In	  the	  opposite	  direction,	  meanwhile,	  social	  backlash	  affects	  the	  politics,	  economics,	  and	  even	  the	  technology	  of	  nuclear	  power	  negatively.	  Social	  pressure	  makes	  political	  decisions	  about	  siting	  and	  regulation	  more	  contested.	  Extending	  time	  spent	  in	  the	  regulatory	  process	  raises	  the	  financial	  cost	  of	  a	  plant,	  accentuating	  its	  high	  upfront	  capital	  cost.	  Furthermore,	  popular	  anxiety	  over	  nuclear	  power	  may	  limit	  research	  funding,	  reducing	  long-­‐term	  technological	  advances	  that	  would,	  paradoxically,	  make	  plants	  both	  safer	  and	  cheaper.[Sovacool	  &	  Valentine,	  Pg	  43-­‐53]	  	  21	  Mearsheimer,	  John	  J.,	  and	  Stephen	  M.	  Walt.	  "The	  Blind	  Man	  and	  the	  Elephant	  in	  the	  Room:	  Robert	  Lieberman	  and	  the	  Israel	  Lobby."	  Perspectives	  on	  Politics	  7.02	  (2009):	  259.	  Print.	  22	  The	  explanation	  that	  rational	  decision	  makers	  are	  convinced	  to	  abandon	  nuclear	  will	  be	  considered,	  through	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  risks	  of	  nuclear	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  fatalities	  and	  economic	  cost,	  to	  see	  whether	  such	  a	  reaction	  is,	  in	  fact,	  purely	  rational.	  
government	  centralization,	  degree	  of	  centralization	  of	  the	  nuclear	  industry,	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  ruling	  government,	  macroeconomic	  variables	  like	  gross	  domestic	  product	  per	  capita,	  interest	  rates,	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  electricity	  consumption,	  and	  level	  of	  knowledge	  about	  nuclear	  power.23	  	  Because	  of	  the	  wealth	  of	  competing	  explanations,	  and	  the	  small	  number	  of	  nuclear	  powered	  countries	  from	  which	  to	  select24,	  cases	  have	  been	  selected	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  use	  of	  Mill’s	  Method	  of	  Difference.	  	  In	  the	  early	  1980s	  the	  difference	  in	  capacity	  between	  established	  programs,	  such	  as	  in	  France,	  and	  emerging	  programs,	  such	  as	  in	  South	  Korea,	  was	  sizeable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The	  cost	  of	  construction	  of	  a	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  will	  not	  be	  considered	  independently,	  as	  it	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  social	  and	  political	  variables	  considered	  elsewhere.	  To	  justify	  this	  omission	  further:	  “Forsberg	  and	  Riech	  (1991)	  suggest	  that	  up	  to	  60%	  of	  the	  capital	  cost	  of	  nuclear	  power	  is	  related	  to	  health,	  safety,	  and	  the	  environment.	  Because	  of	  the	  many	  systems	  devoted	  to	  ensuring	  nuclear	  safety,	  and	  the	  high	  proportion	  of	  safety-­‐related	  costs	  in	  nuclear	  power	  plants,	  overall	  capital	  costs	  are	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  specific	  requirements	  of	  nuclear	  safety	  regulation.”	  [Paffenbarger,	  John,	  and	  International	  Energy	  Agency.	  Nuclear	  Power	  in	  the	  OECD.	  Paris:	  IEA	  Publications,	  2001.	  Print.	  Pg	  136.]	  	  The	  “cost	  of	  construction”	  variable	  will	  be	  considered	  thoroughly	  political,	  therefore,	  and	  not	  evaluated	  independently.	  The	  importance	  of	  political	  and	  regulatory	  difficulties	  in	  increasing	  credit	  risk,	  which	  is	  crucial	  because	  of	  the	  high	  upfront	  capital	  cost	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plants,	  is	  corroborated	  by	  reports	  from	  rating	  companies	  such	  as	  Standard	  &	  Poor.	  [Scheider,	  Mycle,	  and	  Antony	  Froggart.	  The	  
World	  Nuclear	  Industry	  Status	  Report	  2004.	  Rep.	  Brussels:	  Greens-­‐EFA,	  2004.	  Web.	  Jan.	  2014.]	  Public	  opinion	  is	  also	  seen	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  nuclear	  policy	  of	  the	  government,	  and	  hence	  is	  not	  an	  independent	  variable	  on	  its	  own.	  [Pérez-­‐Díaz,	  Víctor,	  and	  Juan	  Carlos	  Rodríguez.	  "Nuclear	  Energy	  and	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  Spain."	  ESTUDIOS	  DE	  POLÍTICA	  
EXTERIOR	  (2008):	  215-­‐25.	  Web.]	  That	  60%	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  plant	  may	  come	  from	  features	  imposed	  by	  regulation	  is	  also	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  observation,	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  	  It	  helps	  explain	  the	  oft-­‐repeated	  fact	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  other	  electricity	  generation	  technologies,	  the	  costs	  for	  nuclear	  have	  not	  gone	  down	  over	  time.	  While	  usually	  attributed	  to	  uniquely	  the	  difficult	  engineering	  challenges	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  this	  finding	  suggests	  instead	  that	  regulation	  and	  the	  political	  forces	  driving	  changes	  to	  regulation	  may	  be	  the	  culprit.	  	  This	  is	  yet	  another	  example	  of	  the	  Catch-­‐22	  that	  affects	  the	  social	  dimension	  of	  nuclear	  power	  –	  whereby	  critics	  end	  up	  worsening	  the	  very	  aspect	  of	  nuclear	  power	  that	  they	  criticize.	  A	  similar	  effect	  connecting	  technology	  and	  safety	  is	  detailed	  by	  Sovacool	  &	  Valentine	  (2012)	  on	  page	  52.	  	  24	  This	  precludes	  large-­‐n	  studies.	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  path	  dependence	  complicates	  comparison	  across	  such	  a	  disparity.	  So,	  this	  thesis	  will	  compare	  within	  two	  groups	  of	  similar	  countries.	  (West)	  Germany	  is	  compared	  to	  Japan	  and	  France,	  while	  Spain	  is	  compared	  to	  Ukraine	  and	  South	  Korea.	  	  	   First,	  this	  thesis	  will	  analyze	  a	  group	  of	  three	  countries	  that	  led	  the	  world	  in	  nuclear	  power	  at	  that	  time	  –	  Japan,	  (West)	  Germany,	  and	  France.	  To	  observers	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  they	  were	  three	  of	  the	  largest	  influences	  on	  the	  global	  scene	  in	  nuclear	  power.25	  Their	  nuclear	  programs	  and	  populations	  were	  comparable	  in	  the	  decade	  prior	  to	  Chernobyl.	  All	  three	  are	  large,	  important	  economies.	  Despite	  their	  similarities	  in	  the	  early	  80s,	  their	  nuclear	  programs	  have	  diverged	  greatly.	  In	  2010,	  before	  Fukushima,	  Germany	  had	  marginally26	  more	  installed	  capacity	  than	  it	  did	  in	  1986:	  20,339	  MWe.	  Meanwhile,	  Japan	  reached	  50	  operational	  reactors	  providing	  44,396	  MWe,	  or	  30%	  of	  its	  electricity.	  France	  now	  operates	  58	  reactors	  to	  provide	  63,130	  MWe	  or	  78%	  of	  total	  electricity.	  In	  short,	  nuclear	  power	  development	  languished	  in	  Germany	  but	  not	  in	  France	  or	  Japan.	  	   	  Additionally,	  this	  thesis	  will	  analyze	  the	  effect	  of	  Three	  Mile	  Island	  and	  Chernobyl	  on	  a	  group	  of	  three	  countries	  that	  had	  smaller	  nuclear	  programs	  and	  less	  stable	  politics	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  accidents:	  Spain,	  South	  Korea,	  and	  Ukraine.	  Their	  nuclear	  power	  situations	  were	  remarkably	  similar	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  They	  were	  also	  all	  engaged	  in	  a	  transition	  to	  democracy	  around	  the	  relevant	  time	  period.27	  	  Since	  then	  their	  programs	  have	  diverged.	  As	  of	  2013	  Spain	  has	  7	  reactors	  generating	  only	  20%	  of	  its	  electricity.	  This	  is	  barely	  more	  than	  in	  1986	  –	  Spain	  completed	  no	  new	  reactors	  since	  1988.	  Ukraine,	  in	  contrast,	  has	  nearly	  doubled	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ha,	  Young-­‐Sun.	  "Republic	  of	  (South)	  Korea."	  Nuclear	  Power	  in	  Developing	  
Countries.	  By	  James	  E.	  Katz	  and	  Onkar	  S.	  Marwah.	  Lexington:	  Lexington,	  1982.	  221-­‐44.	  Print.	  Pg	  239	  26	  Based	  on	  analysis	  of	  the	  tables	  in	  the	  German	  WNA	  country	  profile	  on	  the	  start	  and	  stop	  dates	  of	  individual	  reactors.	  Three	  plants	  entered	  into	  operation	  since	  1986.	  About	  2/3	  of	  the	  capacity	  added,	  however,	  was	  offset	  by	  plant	  closures	  after	  1986	  but	  before	  2010.	  	  27	  Spain	  was	  emerging	  from	  an	  authoritarian	  dictatorship,	  Ukraine	  was	  gaining	  independence	  from	  the	  USSR,	  and	  South	  Korea	  was	  moving	  from	  beneath	  military	  rule.	  This	  complicates	  the	  policy	  space	  in	  which	  nuclear	  decisions	  were	  made.	  
operational	  nuclear	  capacity	  to	  generate	  50%	  of	  its	  electricity	  from	  15	  reactors.	  It	  completed	  several	  reactors	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  and	  has	  plants	  currently	  under	  construction.	  South	  Korea	  has	  quadrupled	  capacity	  to	  23	  reactors	  and	  is	  continuing	  construction.	  Due	  to	  concurrent	  growth	  in	  electricity	  usage,	  nuclear	  provides	  32%	  of	  South	  Korea’s	  electricity.28	  Nuclear	  power	  development	  has	  languished	  in	  Spain,	  but	  not	  in	  South	  Korea	  or	  Ukraine.	  	  While	  analyzed	  separately,	  these	  two	  groups	  of	  cases	  will	  complement	  each	  other	  in	  establishing	  the	  most	  important	  causal	  processes	  and	  differentiating	  variables	  driving	  abrupt	  and	  enduring	  changes	  in	  nuclear	  power	  development.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  All	  numbers	  are	  from	  the	  author’s	  analysis	  of	  data	  from	  the	  WNA.	  	  
Conventional	  Explanation	  	   Before	  endeavoring	  to	  find	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  nuclear	  programs	  stagnate	  after	  an	  accident,	  it	  is	  prudent	  to	  independently	  analyze	  the	  most	  common	  conventional	  explanation.	  One	  such	  explanation	  holds	  that	  nuclear	  accidents	  expose	  the	  dangers	  of	  nuclear	  power.	  Rational	  decision-­‐makers	  become	  convinced,	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  curtailment	  of	  programs.	  However,	  calling	  something	  “dangerous”	  is	  both	  obvious	  and	  unhelpful.	  Anything	  can,	  and	  is,	  quantifiably	  dangerous,	  and	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  avoid	  all	  sources	  of	  danger.	  Modern	  societies	  require	  electricity	  to	  function,	  but	  one	  cannot	  generate	  electricity	  without	  risk	  of	  harm	  to	  both	  workers	  and	  the	  public.	  More	  relevant	  to	  rational	  decision	  makers	  is	  the	  relative	  risk	  of	  different	  sources	  of	  electricity.	  An	  objective	  risk	  assessment	  compares	  risk	  across	  electricity	  generating	  technologies.	  Stating	  the	  risks	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  alone,	  implicitly	  compares	  nuclear	  power	  generation	  to	  infinitely	  perfect,	  risk-­free	  power	  generation.	  This	  is	  often	  misleading	  and	  irrelevant.	  Unsettlingly,	  this	  tactic	  is	  not	  uncommon,	  even	  within	  academia,	  among	  detractors	  of	  nuclear	  power.29	  	  The	  relevant	  risk	  comparison	  is	  between	  nuclear	  power	  generation	  and	  alternative	  sources	  of	  electricity.	  Most	  important	  is	  the	  comparison	  to	  coal,	  which	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  From	  the	  World	  Nuclear	  Industry	  Report	  2004	  in	  regards	  to	  Chernobyl:	  “This	  brief	  review	  has	  explored	  the	  statistics	  of	  fact,	  leading	  to	  the	  axiom	  that	  the	  grand-­‐grand-­‐grandchildren	  of	  our	  children	  will	  suffer	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  accident	  of	  a	  machine	  that	  was	  built	  to	  provide	  a	  service	  to	  people.	  That	  machine	  generated	  power	  for	  two	  years,	  four	  months,	  and	  four	  days	  but	  the	  human	  suffering	  and	  health	  detriment	  will	  go	  on	  for	  generation	  after	  generation.	  Who	  would	  dare	  to	  say	  it	  was	  worth	  the	  risk?”	  (pg	  28)	  This	  simplification	  is	  particularly	  insidious	  as	  it	  denies	  the	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  reactor	  years	  of	  safe	  operation	  worldwide	  before	  and	  since	  Chernobyl.	  	  Sovacool	  and	  Valentine	  likewise	  compare	  risks	  from	  nuclear	  power	  to	  perfect,	  risk-­‐free	  generation.	  “The	  industry	  track	  record	  for	  safety	  is	  far	  from	  exemplary	  considering	  the	  inherently	  risky	  nature	  of	  the	  technology.	  Our	  own	  compilation	  in	  the	  Appendix	  shows	  106	  nuclear	  accidents	  responsible	  for	  4,231	  fatalities	  and	  more	  than	  $253	  billion	  in	  damages	  from	  1952	  to	  2011.	  Worryingly,	  our	  list	  of	  accidents	  is	  conservative	  and	  likely	  underestimates	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  nuclear	  technology	  is	  prone	  to	  failure…”	  (pg	  243)	  Even	  more	  worryingly,	  these	  numbers	  are	  deliberately	  not	  compared	  to	  other	  sources	  of	  electricity,	  which,	  in	  fact,	  cause	  far	  more	  harm	  as	  counted	  in	  both	  lives	  and	  dollars.	  	  
the	  source	  of	  electricity	  that	  nuclear	  power	  actually	  replaces,	  overwhelmingly.30	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2013	  Germany’s	  share	  of	  electricity	  from	  nuclear	  was	  18%,	  down	  from	  over	  25%	  in	  2010.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  share	  of	  electricity	  from	  coal	  rose	  from	  43%	  to	  52%.	  Coal	  stepped	  in	  to	  replace	  nuclear.	  In	  this	  section,	  nuclear	  power	  will	  be	  compared	  to	  coal	  on	  their	  negative	  externalities	  in	  health	  and	  economics.	  Several	  authors	  have	  conducted	  thorough,	  full-­‐cycle,	  risk	  analyses	  comparing	  across	  different	  forms	  of	  electricity	  generation.31	  	  	  Severe	  Accident	  Risks	  	   In	  2010	  the	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Agency	  undertook	  a	  comprehensive	  comparative	  
study	  of	  severe	  accident	  risks	  in	  the	  production	  of	  electricity.	  Severe	  accidents	  are	  of	  particular	  interest	  in	  testing	  the	  conventional	  explanation	  for	  the	  curtailment	  of	  nuclear	  programs.	  The	  database	  catalogues	  1,870	  severe	  energy-­‐related	  accidents,	  1,221	  of	  which	  involved	  coal	  and	  only	  one	  of	  which	  involved	  nuclear	  power	  (Chernobyl).	  When	  added	  together,	  these	  accidents	  have	  been	  responsible	  for	  over	  80,000	  immediate	  deaths,	  31	  of	  which	  occurred	  at	  Chernobyl.32	  When	  normalized	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Yergin,	  2011.	  Pg	  403	  &	  WNA	  Nuclear	  Power	  in	  Germany	  31	  Fritzsche,	  Andrew	  F.	  "The	  Health	  Risks	  of	  Energy	  Production."	  Risk	  Analysis	  9.4	  (1989):	  565-­‐77.	  Web.	  32	  Many	  would	  object	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  31	  immediate	  deaths	  resulting	  from	  Chernobyl	  here	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  4,056	  total	  fatalities,	  as	  reported	  by	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Using	  latent	  fatality	  numbers	  for	  only	  one	  data	  point	  out	  of	  1870,	  however,	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  the	  amount	  of	  energy	  produced,	  nuclear	  power	  is	  among	  the	  least	  dangerous	  sources	  of	  electricity	  production,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  severe	  accidents.	  	  Mining,	  extraction	  and	  transportation	  are	  less	  visible	  links	  in	  the	  electricity	  production	  chain,	  which	  are	  nonetheless	  more	  prone	  to	  severe	  accidents,	  than	  the	  operation	  of	  power	  plants	  themselves.	  Consequently,	  coal	  carries	  risks	  at	  least	  an	  order	  of	  magnitude	  higher	  than	  nuclear.	  	  	  Routine	  Operating	  Risk	  	  	   The	  routine	  operation	  of	  the	  electricity	  production	  fuel	  cycles	  entails	  quantifiable	  statistical	  risks	  for	  both	  workers	  and	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  public.	  This	  category	  of	  risk	  includes	  occupational	  hazards,	  both	  immediate	  and	  long	  term,	  and	  immediate	  risks	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  readily	  quantifiable	  mortality	  risks	  –	  for	  occupational	  risk	  and	  immediate	  public	  risk	  –	  are	  easily	  an	  order	  of	  magnitude	  higher	  for	  the	  coal	  fuel	  cycle	  than	  they	  are	  for	  the	  nuclear	  option.33	  	  Latent	  Public	  Risk	  	  	   Less	  readily	  quantifiable	  are	  the	  long-­‐term	  public	  health	  risks	  associated	  with	  electricity	  production.	  Latent	  deaths	  following	  Chernobyl	  are	  included	  in	  this	  category,	  as	  are	  fatalities	  due	  to	  air	  and	  water	  pollution.	  1989	  estimates	  put	  nuclear	  power	  public	  latent	  risk	  at	  two	  or	  three	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  below	  that	  of	  coal.34	  Strikingly,	  the	  estimated	  number	  of	  deaths	  due	  to	  coal	  pollution	  in	  one	  country	  (Poland)	  in	  one	  year	  (2010)	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  entire	  death	  toll	  due	  to	  Chernobyl.35	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  is	  not	  appropriate.	  Accidents	  in	  coal	  and	  other	  fuel	  cycles	  also	  carry	  heavy	  latent	  fatality	  tolls,	  which	  are	  not	  as	  well	  quantified	  as	  those	  from	  Chernobyl.	  Accidents	  involving	  coal	  slurry	  ponds,	  to	  take	  one	  example,	  leak	  known	  carcinogens	  into	  local	  water	  supplies	  causing	  raised	  cancer	  risk	  in	  the	  local	  population	  in	  the	  same	  way	  fallout	  from	  Chernobyl	  did.	  The	  Center	  for	  Health	  and	  the	  Global	  Environment	  at	  Harvard	  Medical	  School	  estimates	  that	  carcinogens	  from	  coal	  use	  cause	  thousands	  of	  excess	  deaths	  per	  year	  (pg	  82).	  Because	  of	  this	  data	  disparity,	  latent	  deaths	  from	  Chernobyl	  will	  be	  included	  in	  comparisons	  of	  long-­‐term	  risks	  over	  generalized	  populations,	  not	  severe	  accident	  risks.	  	  33	  Fritzsche,	  1989.	  	  34	  Fritzsche,	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In	  terms	  of	  public	  health,	  nuclear	  power	  must	  be	  acknowledged	  as	  undoubtedly	  less	  dangerous	  than	  coal	  power.	  	  Alternative	  Sources	  	   An	  objective	  risk	  assessment	  would	  be	  incomplete	  without	  also	  comparing	  nuclear	  power	  to	  alternatives	  other	  than	  coal.	  Comparisons	  to	  natural	  gas	  and	  renewables	  can	  be	  made	  with	  the	  caveat	  that	  such	  a	  replacement	  is	  less	  automatic	  and	  less	  common	  than	  replacement	  by	  coal	  generated	  electricity.	  However,	  neither	  natural	  gas	  nor	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  produce	  electricity	  with	  risks	  quantifiably	  lower	  than	  nuclear.363738	  	  Conclusion	  In	  short,	  the	  conventional	  explanation	  for	  the	  curtailment	  of	  nuclear	  power	  after	  an	  accident	  –	  namely	  that	  nuclear	  accidents	  expose	  the	  dangers	  of	  nuclear	  power	  and	  convince	  rational	  decision-­‐makers	  –	  is	  not	  backed	  by	  dry	  rationality.	  The	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  nuclear	  power	  programs	  stagnate	  must	  be	  found	  elsewhere.	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France,	  Japan	  &	  Germany	  –	  Mechanisms	  of	  Change	  	   This	  section	  seeks	  to	  establish	  the	  mechanisms	  driving	  constancy	  or	  enduring	  change	  in	  nuclear	  power	  development	  by	  analyzing	  the	  historical	  progression	  in	  each	  country	  in	  this	  set.	  The	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  multiple	  current	  and	  historical	  accounts	  of	  nuclear	  power	  development	  including	  World	  Nuclear	  Association	  country	  profiles,	  World	  Nuclear	  Industry	  Reports,	  publications	  from	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency,	  articles	  on	  political	  history,	  and	  social	  scientific	  comparative	  analyses	  of	  anti-­‐nuclear	  movements.	  	  	   Two	  mechanisms	  stand	  out	  as	  having	  definitive	  long-­‐term	  impact	  on	  the	  fortunes	  of	  German	  nuclear	  power.	  First,	  and	  most	  important,	  was	  the	  adoption	  in	  1986	  of	  an	  anti-­‐nuclear	  platform	  by	  one	  of	  the	  major	  parties	  of	  the	  German	  Bundestag,	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party,	  in	  response	  to	  Chernobyl.	  This	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  power	  ensured	  the	  longevity	  of	  anti-­‐nuclear	  sentiment	  in	  the	  German	  political	  system.	  Despite	  losing	  control	  of	  the	  legislature	  in	  1987,	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  maintained	  its	  anti-­‐nuclear	  platform.	  Upon	  retaking	  office	  in	  1998,	  a	  full	  twelve	  years	  after	  Chernobyl,	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  led	  Germany	  to	  officially	  begin	  its	  phase	  out	  of	  nuclear	  power.	  A	  second	  mechanism,	  important	  for	  its	  effect	  in	  the	  meantime,	  was	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  German	  utilities	  to	  invest	  in	  new	  nuclear	  capacity	  after	  Chernobyl.	  Furthermore,	  this	  reaction	  is	  understandable.	  In	  the	  German	  policy	  environment	  even	  fully	  operational	  nuclear	  plants	  faced	  ceaseless	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  challenges.	  The	  clearest	  example	  is	  the	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  at	  Mülheim	  Kärlich,	  shut	  down	  in	  1988,	  which	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  only	  nuclear	  reactors	  ever	  to	  have	  been	  closed	  for	  political	  reasons	  after	  beginning	  operation.39	  Such	  a	  precedent	  undermines	  inspire	  investor	  confidence	  in	  German	  nuclear	  power.	  Local	  public	  hostility,	  increased	  costs,	  and	  other	  factors	  likely	  also	  contributed	  to	  utility	  unwillingness.	  	  	   Neither	  mechanism	  became	  activated	  in	  France	  or	  Japan,	  nor	  did	  they	  curtail	  their	  nuclear	  programs.	  Historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  ensured	  the	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continuation	  of	  their	  nuclear	  development	  help	  put	  the	  German	  story	  into	  perspective.	  	  France	  experienced	  just	  as	  much	  public	  protest	  against	  nuclear	  power	  as	  Germany	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  –	  both	  at	  the	  local	  level	  and	  when	  it	  came	  to	  mass	  mobilizations.40	  France	  also	  experienced	  a	  minor	  resurgence	  of	  protest	  after	  Chernobyl.41	  The	  French	  political-­‐legal	  structure	  surrounding	  their	  nuclear	  power	  program,	  however,	  ensured	  that	  no	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  were	  ever	  successfully	  challenged	  through	  the	  legal	  system.42	  There	  is	  a	  single	  case	  of	  a	  potential	  site	  given	  up	  as	  a	  result	  of	  protests,	  out	  of	  political	  expediency,	  namely	  Polgoff.43	  Rüdig,	  in	  his	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  anti-­‐nuclear	  movements,	  highlights	  two	  components	  of	  the	  French	  system	  that	  allowed	  this.	  First,	  the	  centralized	  nature	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  nuclear	  power	  program,	  spearheaded	  by	  the	  EDF	  and	  the	  central	  government,	  left	  little	  authority	  over	  nuclear	  decisions	  to	  the	  local	  authorities	  directly	  facing	  public	  opposition.	  Furthermore,	  there	  was	  a	  distinct	  lack	  of	  political	  opportunity	  to	  influence	  nuclear	  policy	  at	  the	  national	  level.44	  Political	  support	  by	  those	  in	  power	  never	  wavered.45	  46	  A	  streamlined	  regulatory	  system,	  immune	  to	  local	  challenge,	  worked	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  consistent	  political	  support	  to	  ensure	  the	  continued	  development	  of	  nuclear	  power	  after	  Chernobyl.	  	  Japan	  enthusiastically	  embraced	  nuclear	  power	  within	  decades	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  benefitting	  from	  the	  Atoms	  for	  Peace	  program.	  	  Nuclear	  power	  became	  a	  national	  strategic	  priority	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  1973	  oil	  shock,	  which	  left	  a	  deep	  impression	  on	  the	  country	  (at	  the	  time	  Japan	  relied	  on	  oil	  for	  66%	  of	  its	  electricity	  production).47	  Although	  beginning	  its	  program	  with	  imported	  technology,	  the	  Japanese	  nuclear	  industry	  was	  largely	  independent	  by	  the	  late	  1970s.	  Since	  then,	  Japan	  has	  consistently	  spent	  nearly	  twice	  as	  much	  on	  R&D	  for	  nuclear	  energy	  as	  any	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  other	  OECD	  country.48	  The	  political	  commitment	  to	  nuclear	  power	  that	  this	  reflects	  has	  been	  mirrored	  by	  a	  strong	  commitment	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  country’s	  electrical	  utilities.	  Ten	  different	  electrical	  utilities	  own	  and	  operate	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  in	  Japan.49	  The	  willingness	  of	  utilities	  to	  build	  nuclear	  power	  has	  not	  faltered,	  nor	  has	  government	  support	  for	  the	  industry.	  	  Similarly	  to	  France,	  “In	  the	  highly	  ‘closed’	  Japanese	  political	  system,	  any	  dissent	  was	  difficult	  to	  establish	  on	  the	  national	  agenda.”50	  However,	  Japan	  experienced	  little	  anti-­‐nuclear	  protest	  to	  begin	  with.	  At	  the	  national	  level,	  Japan	  had	  no	  anti-­‐nuclear	  mobilization	  before	  Chernobyl,	  which	  sparked	  such	  sentiments	  nationally	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  On	  the	  first	  anniversary	  of	  Chernobyl,	  anti-­‐nuclear	  rallies	  in	  Tokyo	  attracted	  25,000	  people.51	  Such	  uproar	  was	  emergent	  and	  short-­‐lived,	  and	  left	  national	  politics	  unfazed.	  	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  the	  Japanese	  cultural	  practice	  of	  providing	  host	  communities	  with	  compensation,	  so	  called	  “strange	  money”,	  and	  subsidies	  is	  accepted	  and	  applied	  widely	  in	  environmental	  matters.	  This	  has	  been	  an	  excellent	  diffuser	  of	  local	  protest.52	  	  Bringing	  together	  the	  historical	  analyses	  results	  in	  a	  clearer	  and	  more	  nuanced	  picture	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  nuclear	  power	  programs	  change	  or	  remain	  the	  same.	  In	  all	  three	  cases	  the	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  stands	  out	  as	  a	  powerful	  mechanism	  determining	  the	  course	  of	  nuclear	  power	  development	  over	  decades.	  The	  experiences	  of	  France	  and	  Japan	  also	  put	  the	  German	  “utility	  unwillingness”	  mechanism	  into	  perspective.	  Local	  challenges	  to	  nuclear	  plants,	  both	  legal-­‐wise	  and	  protest-­‐wise,	  were	  very	  much	  present	  in	  France	  as	  well	  as	  Germany.53	  The	  French	  regulatory	  structure,	  however,	  effectively	  maintained	  short	  construction	  times	  and	  limited	  investor	  risk.	  Both	  France	  and	  Japan	  successfully	  used	  financial	  compensation	  to	  lessen	  local	  tension.	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  Paffenbarger	  and	  International	  Energy	  Agency,	  2001.	  Pg	  232.	  49	  World	  Nuclear	  Association.	  Japan.	  50	  Rüdig,	  1990.	  Pg	  91.	  51	  Ibid.	  Pg	  344.	  52	  Ibid.	  Pg	  211.	  53	  Kolb,	  2007.	  Pg	  241.	  
Inconsistency	  within	  the	  German	  regulatory	  system	  is	  a	  more	  refined	  version	  of	  the	  secondary	  mechanism	  causing	  the	  stagnation	  of	  nuclear	  power.	  	  This	  is	  corroborated	  by	  a	  finer	  analysis	  of	  the	  history	  of	  German	  nuclear	  power	  development.	  German	  nuclear	  power	  construction	  went	  through	  a	  period	  of	  decline	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  due	  primarily	  to	  local	  public	  hostility	  and	  legal	  challenges	  to	  regulation.	  However,	  the	  wastefulness	  of	  a	  messy	  regulatory	  process	  sparked	  political	  action,	  and	  the	  process	  was	  streamlined	  in	  1981.	  Three	  additional	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  began	  construction	  in	  the	  following	  year.54	  Chernobyl	  ensured	  a	  resurgence	  of	  regulatory	  and	  legal	  issues.	  This	  narrative	  highlights	  the	  impact	  of	  political	  considerations	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  regulatory	  structures.	  Hence,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Germany55,	  an	  inconsistent	  regulatory	  structure	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  secondary,	  but	  still	  important,	  mechanism	  affecting	  nuclear	  power	  development.	  	  The	  mechanisms	  with	  the	  most	  enduring	  effect	  on	  nuclear	  power	  stagnation	  are	  confusion	  within	  the	  regulatory	  system	  and	  the	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  in	  national	  party	  politics.	  Both	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  were	  activated	  in	  Germany	  in	  response	  to	  Chernobyl,	  and	  neither	  was	  activated	  in	  France	  or	  Japan.	  Impactful	  variables	  in	  the	  subsequent	  analysis,	  then,	  are	  those	  that	  influence	  whether	  these	  mechanisms	  become	  activated	  or	  not	  after	  an	  accident.	  Some	  possible	  explanations	  of	  such	  variation	  include	  differences	  in	  historical	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  power,	  economic	  dependence	  on	  imported	  fuel,	  degree	  of	  government	  centralization,	  degree	  of	  centralization	  of	  the	  nuclear	  industry,	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  ruling	  government,	  macroeconomic	  variables	  like	  GDP,	  interest	  rates,	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  electricity	  consumption,	  and	  level	  of	  knowledge	  about	  nuclear	  power.	  These	  will	  be	  analyzed	  in	  the	  following	  section	  for	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  two	  mechanisms	  found	  in	  this	  section	  to	  be	  most	  relevant	  to	  long-­‐term	  nuclear	  development	  in	  Germany,	  France,	  and	  Japan.	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  Kolb,	  2007.	  Pg	  251.	  55	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  however,	  this	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  the	  primary	  process	  causing	  nuclear	  stagnation.	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  Historical	  Investment	  in	  Nuclear	  Power	  	   For	  these	  three	  high-­‐GDP	  countries	  there	  are	  several	  ways	  to	  conceptualize	  historical	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  power.	  Potentially	  relevant,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  sunk	  cost	  argument	  based	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  government	  investment	  into	  research	  and	  development.	  Such	  investment	  into	  the	  nuclear	  energy	  program	  is	  a	  sunk	  cost	  that	  amounts	  to	  little	  if	  a	  program	  is	  allowed	  to	  stagnate	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  For	  these	  three	  countries,	  however,	  prior	  research	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  power	  at	  the	  time	  of	  an	  accident	  does	  not	  have	  explanatory	  power	  over	  the	  consistency	  of	  political	  support	  for	  nuclear	  power.	  Quantitatively	  Germany	  and	  France	  invested	  similarly	  in	  nuclear	  power	  research	  and	  development	  in	  the	  decade	  before	  Chernobyl.56	  There	  is	  also	  a	  qualitative	  lack	  of	  explanatory	  power.	  The	  sunk	  cost	  to	  the	  government	  did	  not	  weigh	  heavily	  on	  the	  minds	  of	  politicians	  when	  nuclear	  power	  was	  taken	  off	  the	  table.	  Germany’s	  SPD	  quickly	  terminated	  long	  running	  R&D	  efforts	  in	  North-­‐Rhine	  Westphalia	  shortly	  after	  Chernobyl,	  for	  example.57	  Although	  not	  R&D	  investment,	  Germany	  has	  also	  showed	  ambivalence	  toward	  the	  availability	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  in	  tax	  revenue	  from	  nuclear	  power.	  Sunk	  cost,	  it	  appears,	  does	  not	  have	  explanatory	  power	  over	  the	  relevant	  mechanism	  in	  these	  three	  high-­‐GDP	  countries.	  	  Historical	  investment	  may	  also	  lead	  to	  disparities	  in	  dependence	  on	  nuclear	  power	  that	  then	  impact	  the	  political	  feasibility	  of	  activation	  of	  our	  two	  mechanisms.	  Dependence	  on	  nuclear	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Chernobyl,	  however,	  does	  not	  have	  explanatory	  power	  even	  within	  this	  group	  of	  cases.	  Japan	  was	  less	  dependent	  on	  nuclear	  power	  than	  was	  Germany,	  on	  a	  per	  capita	  basis,	  while	  France	  was	  dramatically	  more	  dependent.58	  If	  one	  extends	  beyond	  these	  three	  cases,	  which	  were	  similar	  in	  both	  measures	  of	  prior	  investment	  to	  begin	  with,	  correlation	  falls	  away	  further.	  South	  Korea	  had	  invested	  very	  little,	  relatively	  speaking,	  by	  1986,	  but	  has	  since	  surpassed	  Germany	  in	  nuclear	  power	  capacity.	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  Paffenbarger	  and	  International	  Energy	  Agency,	  2001.	  Figure	  28,	  Pg	  232.	  57	  World	  Nuclear	  Association.	  Germany.	  58	  Author’s	  calculations	  from	  WNA	  data	  on	  capacity	  and	  historical	  population	  data.	  The	  indicator	  mentioned	  is	  (nuclear	  capacity	  in	  1986)/(population	  in	  1980)	  	  The	  6	  year	  delay	  is	  due	  mainly	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  population	  data.	  	  	  
	   This	  does	  have	  explanatory	  power!	  Quantitatively,	  in	  1986	  Japan	  depended	  on	  energy	  imports	  for	  81%	  of	  its	  energy,	  France	  for	  52%,	  and	  Germany	  for	  44%.	  The	  difference	  is	  even	  more	  pronounced	  if	  one	  takes	  into	  consideration	  the	  lag	  time	  in	  building	  reactors	  –	  in	  1976	  the	  percentages	  were	  91%,	  77%,	  and	  48%	  respectively.	  	  
	  Qualitatively,	  a	  sense	  of	  dependence	  on	  energy	  imports	  is	  a	  very	  plausible	  motivation	  for	  sustained	  political	  support	  for	  nuclear	  power,	  resisting	  politicization.	  Many	  sources	  corroborate	  this	  as	  a	  motivating	  political	  factor.	  Import	  dependence	  does	  not	  tell	  the	  full	  story,	  however,	  as	  it	  has	  limited	  explanatory	  power	  over	  the	  second	  mechanism,	  the	  inconsistency	  of	  the	  regulatory	  system	  in	  the	  face	  of	  local	  challenge,	  and	  is	  unable	  to	  explain	  why	  52%	  dependence	  is	  so	  much	  different	  from	  44%.	  Furthermore,	  countries	  from	  outside	  this	  group	  of	  three	  hint	  at	  the	  incompleteness	  of	  explanation	  by	  this	  variable	  alone.	  	  Spain,	  for	  example,	  was	  more	  highly	  dependent	  on	  energy	  imports	  than	  France	  in	  the	  entire	  1970s,	  but	  ended	  up	  suspending	  its	  nuclear	  program.	  Italy,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  complete	  abandonment	  of	  its	  program	  through	  referendum	  was	  more	  highly	  dependent	  on	  energy	  imports	  than	  Japan.	  	  Regime	  Type	  
Energy	  imports,	  net	  (%	  of	  energy	  use)	  Source:	  World	  Development	  Indicators	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   All	  three	  countries	  were	  and	  have	  continued	  to	  be	  established	  democracies.	  	  Government	  Structure	  	   Japan	  is	  a	  parliamentary	  representative	  democracy,	  Germany	  is	  a	  federal	  parliamentary	  republic,	  and	  France	  is	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  representative	  democracy.	  All	  three	  have	  multi-­‐party	  systems	  that	  accommodate	  small	  parties,	  but	  are	  dominated	  by	  two	  major	  parties.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  central	  government	  and	  the	  legislature	  seems	  to	  lack	  explanatory	  power.	  	  That	  Germany	  is	  a	  federal	  system,	  however,	  does	  carry	  explanatory	  power.	  The	  federal	  governmental	  structure	  influences	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  nuclear	  regulatory	  system	  greatly.	  The	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  at	  Mülheim	  Kärlich,	  again,	  was	  shut	  down	  for	  political	  reasons	  after	  beginning	  normal	  operation.	  Disagreement	  between	  the	  federal	  and	  Länder	  governments	  over	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  construction	  licenses	  led	  to	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  1302MWe	  nuclear	  plant	  after	  only	  2	  years	  of	  operation.59	  In	  general,	  "responsibility	  for	  licensing	  the	  construction	  and	  operation	  of	  all	  nuclear	  facilities	  is	  shared	  between	  the	  federal	  and	  Länder	  governments,	  which	  confers	  something	  close	  to	  a	  power	  of	  veto	  to	  both."60	  Indirectly,	  also,	  the	  federal	  nature	  of	  the	  German	  system	  helped	  facilitate	  the	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  power	  on	  the	  national	  stage.61	  For	  example,	  after	  1987,	  when	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  lost	  control	  over	  the	  federal	  government,	  	  “the	  SPD	  maintained	  a	  strict	  anti-­‐nuclear	  stance	  at	  the	  state	  level.”62	  	  	  Centralization	  of	  the	  Nuclear	  Industry	  	   The	  level	  of	  centralization	  of	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  has	  two	  potentially	  relevant	  components.	  First,	  the	  centralization	  of	  the	  industry	  itself	  could	  conceivably	  aid	  in	  insulating	  it	  from	  changes	  wrought	  by	  the	  responses	  to	  an	  accident.	  Secondly,	  the	  amount	  of	  direct	  state	  involvement	  in	  the	  industry	  at	  the	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time	  of	  an	  accident	  could	  affect	  the	  state	  response.63	  Both	  components	  are	  strongly	  present	  in	  France,	  as	  its	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  are	  operated	  entirely	  by	  one	  company	  –	  Electricité	  de	  France	  (EDF),	  a	  utility	  in	  which	  the	  state	  owns	  an	  85%	  share.64	  Areva,	  a	  company	  that	  constructs	  nuclear	  power	  plants,	  is	  the	  world’s	  largest	  nuclear	  company	  and	  over	  90%	  French-­‐government	  owned.	  In	  contrast,	  Germany’s	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  are	  operated	  by	  four	  different	  utilities,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  privately	  owned.65	  Japan,	  however,	  is	  more	  similar	  to	  Germany	  on	  this	  count.	  Ten	  different	  utilities	  own	  and	  operate	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  in	  Japan,	  none	  of	  which	  are	  owned	  by	  the	  government.66	  Neither	  the	  Japanese	  nor	  the	  German	  state	  has	  stakes	  in	  their	  nuclear	  companies.	  	  	   A	  centralized	  nuclear	  industry,	  then,	  may	  well	  be	  of	  supplementary	  relevance	  for	  France.	  Having	  a	  decentralized	  industry,	  however,	  was	  not	  a	  problem	  for	  Japan	  and	  likely	  not	  the	  main	  problem	  for	  Germany.	  	  Mandate	  of	  the	  Ruling	  Government	  	   Although	  also	  plausible,	  this	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  explanatory	  power	  across	  this	  group	  of	  countries.	  Of	  the	  three,	  only	  the	  Japanese	  Liberal	  Democratic	  Party	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  enjoyed	  a	  strong	  governmental	  mandate	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Chernobyl.	  	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  	   All	  three	  have	  high	  gross	  domestic	  product	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  Access	  to	  Credit	  Access	  to	  credit	  in	  an	  immediate	  sense,	  namely	  inflation	  and	  interest	  rates,	  can	  be	  discounted	  as	  a	  significant	  variable.	  Qualitatively,	  no	  case	  studies	  reviewed	  for	  this	  thesis	  made	  reference	  this	  as	  causally	  important	  in	  any	  country	  specifically.	  Quantitatively,	  statistical	  analysis	  finds	  a	  negative,	  but	  statistically	  insignificant,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Beyond	  such	  quantifiable	  difference,	  efforts	  by	  the	  government	  to	  promote	  nuclear	  power,	  such	  as	  by	  providing	  subsidies	  or	  compensation	  (as	  has	  been	  the	  case	  in	  both	  France	  and	  Japan)	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  independent	  variable.	  64	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  correlation	  between	  inflation	  and	  interest	  rates	  on	  nuclear	  reactor	  construction	  starts.67	  	  Rate	  of	  Growth	  of	  Electricity	  Consumption	  	  Electricity	  demand	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  causal	  variable,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  continuation	  or	  lack	  thereof	  of	  nuclear	  programs.	  This	  is	  evidenced	  strongly	  by	  the	  case	  of	  France.	  France	  has	  sported	  a	  large	  surplus	  of	  electrical	  capacity	  for	  many	  years;	  they	  even	  export	  electricity.	  French	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  in	  the	  world	  that	  load-­‐follow	  (i.e.	  sometimes	  work	  at	  below	  full	  capacity),	  lessening	  their	  capacity	  factor	  relative	  to	  the	  world	  average.	  They	  have	  slowed	  construction	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  as	  the	  grid	  reaches	  capacity,	  but	  that	  would	  happen	  with	  any	  form	  of	  power	  generation.68	  This	  does	  not	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  nuclear	  power	  construction	  is	  more	  strongly	  correlated	  to	  electricity	  demand	  than	  other	  forms	  of	  power	  generation.	  	  Level	  of	  knowledge	  of	  Nuclear	  Power	  	   Ignorance	  about	  nuclear	  power	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  correlate	  with	  lower	  rates	  of	  acceptance	  of	  nuclear	  energy.69	  It	  is	  unfair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  German	  public	  was	  less	  knowledgeable	  about	  nuclear	  power,	  however.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  these	  three	  countries,	  the	  level	  of	  public	  knowledge	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  much	  impact.	  	  	  Conclusion	  	   From	  this	  analysis,	  we	  have	  found	  the	  most	  important	  variables	  affecting	  enduring	  change	  in	  nuclear	  power	  development	  after	  an	  accident	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  they	  act.	  For	  established	  democracies	  with	  a	  high	  GDP	  and	  a	  large	  nuclear	  program,	  the	  most	  important	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  a	  nuclear	  program	  stagnates	  after	  an	  accident	  are	  confusion	  within	  the	  regulatory	  system	  and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  an	  anti-­‐nuclear	  platform	  by	  a	  national	  political	  party.	  Both	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  were	  activated	  in	  Germany	  in	  response	  to	  Chernobyl,	  and	  neither	  was	  activated	  in	  France	  or	  Japan.	  Dependence	  on	  energy	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imports	  and	  level	  of	  federalization	  of	  the	  government	  have	  clear	  explanatory	  power	  over	  this	  difference	  in	  mechanism	  activation.	  Of	  supplementary	  relevance	  may	  be	  a	  highly	  centralized	  or	  state-­‐controlled	  utility,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  France,	  and	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  current	  government,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan.	  	  
Ukraine,	  South	  Korea	  &	  Spain	  –	  Mechanisms	  of	  Change	  	   In	  the	  previous	  section	  we	  analyzed	  the	  case	  of	  established	  democracies	  with	  high	  GDP.	  Our	  second	  group	  of	  countries	  introduces	  additional	  complexity,	  allowing	  us	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  conclusions	  are	  valid	  in	  a	  broader	  context.	  Spain,	  Ukraine,	  and	  South	  Korea	  were	  all	  moving	  through	  transitions	  to	  democracy	  at	  the	  time	  they	  made	  enduring	  decisions	  about	  nuclear	  power.	  In	  all	  countries,	  therefore,	  there	  was	  tremendous	  political	  opportunity	  and	  uncertainty	  the	  national	  level,	  which	  has	  been	  found	  to	  facilitate	  politicization.70	  Furthermore,	  all	  of	  the	  countries	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  had	  “closed”	  regulatory	  systems,	  as	  they	  lacked	  the	  democratic	  infrastructure	  to	  process	  complaints	  centrally.71	  These	  three	  countries,	  then,	  offer	  a	  phenomenal	  comparison	  to	  the	  previous	  group.	  	  	   The	  mechanism	  by	  which	  Spanish	  nuclear	  power	  was	  suspended	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  cemented	  in	  place	  by	  the	  accident	  at	  Three	  Mile	  Island.	  Nuclear	  energy	  became	  a	  nationally	  politicized	  issue	  in	  a	  uniquely	  Spanish	  way,	  by	  becoming	  a	  symbol	  of	  Basque	  nationalism.	  Nuclear	  development	  began	  and	  proceeded	  rapidly	  under	  the	  Francoist	  regime.72	  A	  coalition	  of	  Spanish	  electrical	  utilities	  and	  economically	  powerful	  Spanish	  banks	  drove	  implementation.73	  New	  nuclear	  plants	  announced	  in	  1973	  and	  1974	  were	  disproportionately	  placed	  in	  the	  Basque	  and	  Catalan	  regions	  with	  suppressed	  separatist	  sentiments.	  Franco’s	  death	  in	  1975	  prompted	  the	  democratization	  of	  the	  Spanish	  government,	  and	  unleashed	  previously	  dormant	  political	  forces.	  Many	  sites	  never	  got	  off	  the	  ground,	  so	  when	  democratization	  began	  in	  1976	  disagreement	  and	  political	  heat	  centered	  on	  the	  Lemoniz	  nuclear	  plant	  under	  construction	  not	  far	  from	  Bilbao	  –	  the	  largest	  city	  in	  Basque	  country.	  Although	  local	  opposition	  barely	  registered,	  regional	  opposition	  blossomed.	  A	  demonstration	  in	  Bilbao	  on	  July	  14th	  1977	  brought	  somewhere	  between	  150,000	  and	  200,000	  protesters	  into	  the	  streets.	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“A	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  demonstration	  reveals	  that	  protest	  against	  nuclear	  energy	  was	  perhaps	  not	  the	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  action,	  although	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  credentials	  of	  the	  organizers	  are	  not	  in	  doubt…	  The	  main	  mobilization	  for	  the	  demonstration	  was,	  however,	  mainly	  carried	  out	  by	  far	  left	  [Basque]	  nationalist	  forces”74	  This	  pattern	  of	  anti-­‐nuclear	  protest	  tied	  to	  regionalist	  opposition	  was	  mirrored	  on	  a	  smaller	  scale	  in	  other	  regions	  of	  Spain.	  The	  National	  Energy	  Plan	  of	  1979	  maintained	  the	  pro-­‐nuclear	  commitment	  inherited	  from	  the	  Franco	  regime,	  drawing	  criticism	  from	  the	  main	  opposition	  parties	  –	  the	  Socialist	  Party	  (PSOE)	  and	  the	  Communist	  Party	  (PCE).	  These	  same	  parties	  officially	  “adopted	  stringent	  anti-­‐nuclear	  positions	  after	  the	  1979	  accident	  at	  Three	  Mile	  Island.”75	  	  This	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  power	  allowed	  anti-­‐nuclear	  sentiments	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  public	  consciousness	  for	  years	  after	  public	  protests	  lost	  steam.	  Three	  years	  on,	  when	  the	  Socialist	  Party	  (PSOE)	  won	  in	  election	  of	  October	  1982,	  nuclear	  power	  came	  under	  a	  de	  facto	  moratorium	  with	  the	  National	  Energy	  Plan	  of	  1983	  (PEN-­‐1983).	  Construction	  stopped	  at	  five	  plants,	  including	  the	  two	  highly	  disputed	  units	  at	  Lemoniz.76	  This	  proceeded	  despite	  the	  cost	  of	  doing	  so.77	  The	  moratorium	  was	  confirmed	  eight	  years	  later	  and	  made	  into	  law	  in	  1994.	  In	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  longevity	  of	  anti-­‐nuclear	  positions	  once	  politicized,	  the	  PSOE	  Premier	  elected	  in	  2004	  and	  2008	  re-­‐confirmed	  plans	  aimed	  at	  a	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  after	  both	  elections.78	  	  	  	   South	  Korea	  had	  a	  rather	  similar	  historical	  progression	  that	  followed	  a	  few	  years	  behind	  Spain.	  It	  did	  not,	  however,	  result	  in	  the	  abandonment	  of	  South	  Korea’s	  similarly	  sized	  nuclear	  program.	  In	  1979	  President	  Park	  Chung-­‐hee	  was	  assassinated,	  ending	  his	  18	  years	  in	  military-­‐backed	  office.	  Military	  rule	  was	  soon	  re-­‐instated,	  however,	  with	  a	  coup	  d’etat	  in	  December	  of	  the	  same	  year.	  Popular	  protest	  mobilizing	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  emerged	  to	  oppose	  this	  development,	  but	  did	  not	  succeed,	  nor	  incorporate	  nuclear	  power	  in	  any	  way.	  This	  runs	  in	  contrast	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  to	  the	  Basque	  nationalist	  protests	  in	  Spain,	  which	  took	  advantage	  of	  anti-­‐nuclear	  protests,	  thereby	  amplifying	  them.	  In	  1987	  popular	  protest,	  with	  mobilization	  numbering	  in	  the	  millions,	  successfully	  brought	  fully	  democratic	  elections	  to	  South	  Korea.	  Again,	  even	  so	  soon	  after	  Chernobyl,	  nuclear	  power	  had	  no	  part	  in	  these	  mass	  mobilizations.	  This	  necessarily	  introduces	  additional	  nuance	  into	  the	  politicization	  mechanism.	  	  	   Ukraine	  completes	  the	  comparison	  set.	  Whereas	  the	  Spanish	  nuclear	  energy	  program	  came	  under	  pressure	  and	  stagnated,	  the	  South	  Korean	  nuclear	  energy	  program	  did	  not	  come	  under	  pressure	  and	  did	  not	  stagnate,	  the	  Ukrainian	  nuclear	  energy	  program	  came	  under	  tremendous	  pressure	  and	  yet	  did	  not	  stagnate.	  This	  makes	  Ukraine	  particularly	  interesting.	  Chernobyl-­‐4,	  the	  fourth	  of	  four	  units	  of	  the	  Chernobyl	  nuclear	  power	  complex,	  experienced	  a	  steam	  explosion	  and	  meltdown	  after	  an	  ill-­‐fated	  test	  on	  April	  26th,	  1986.	  Thirty-­‐one	  people	  were	  killed	  as	  an	  immediate	  result	  of	  the	  radiation	  released,	  and	  the	  detection	  of	  said	  radiation	  elsewhere	  set	  off	  alarm	  bells	  the	  world	  over.	  Within	  Ukraine,	  45,000	  people	  were	  evacuated	  immediately,	  while	  upwards	  of	  300,000	  people	  were	  eventually	  resettled	  due	  to	  radiological	  contamination	  of	  the	  environment.79	  A	  part	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  at	  the	  time,	  popular	  concern	  was	  suppressed	  and	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  under	  construction	  continued	  unimpeded	  for	  a	  few	  years.	  Within	  a	  year	  of	  the	  disaster,	  a	  new	  Ukrainian	  nuclear	  power	  plant,	  Zaporozhe-­‐3,	  entered	  commercial	  operation.	  Another	  plant	  followed	  suit	  later	  in	  1987,	  two	  in	  1988	  and	  another	  in	  1989.	  Negative	  opinions	  of	  nuclear	  power	  eventually	  made	  themselves	  known,	  however.	  In	  1989,	  in	  commemoration	  of	  the	  third	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Chernobyl-­‐4	  explosion,	  30,000	  people	  protested	  in	  Kiev	  for	  the	  shutdown	  of	  the	  remaining	  Chernobyl	  units.80	  Keeping	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  was	  still	  during	  Soviet	  rule,	  such	  a	  showing	  can	  be	  considered	  impressive.	  As	  an	  indication	  of	  scale,	  however,	  participation	  in	  the	  anti-­‐	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  additional	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  In	  many	  ways,	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nuclear	  protests	  was	  dwarfed	  by	  protests	  suggesting	  a	  desire	  for	  independence,	  which	  attracted	  over	  half	  of	  a	  million	  people.	  In	  direct	  contrast	  to	  Spain	  such	  a	  nationalist	  movement	  did	  not	  unite	  with	  anti-­‐nuclear	  forces.	  	   In	  April	  of	  1990,	  four	  years	  after	  Chernobyl,	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  Ukraine	  halted	  construction	  on	  all	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  in	  Ukraine.81	  No	  move	  was	  made	  on	  closing	  the	  remaining	  Chernobyl	  plants.	  Ukraine	  declared	  independence	  in	  August	  of	  1991.	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  a	  trigger	  for	  change	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  destructive	  fire	  in	  Chernobyl	  unit	  2	  on	  October	  11th.	  Chernobyl-­‐2	  was	  promptly	  shut	  down,	  and	  the	  government	  promised	  to	  shut	  down	  the	  remaining	  reactors	  by	  1993.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  officially	  dissolved	  on	  December	  26th,	  1991.	  	  	   Despite	  facing	  what	  observers	  at	  the	  time	  called	  “enormous	  public	  opposition”82	  toward	  nuclear	  projects	  the	  newly	  independent	  government	  of	  Ukraine	  voted	  in	  1993	  to	  both	  lift	  the	  nuclear	  power	  moratorium	  and	  to	  delay	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  remaining	  two	  Chernobyl	  units.83	  The	  sixth	  unit	  of	  the	  Zaporozhe	  power	  plant	  was	  promptly	  completed	  and	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  grid	  in	  October	  of	  1995.84	  The	  government	  and	  the	  national	  nuclear	  utility,	  furthermore,	  were	  enthusiastic	  to	  complete	  two	  large	  units	  left	  near	  80%	  completion	  in	  1990	  –	  Khmelnitski-­‐2	  and	  Rovno-­‐4.85	  The	  negotiation	  of	  international	  loans	  specific	  to	  this	  purpose	  carried	  the	  requirement	  of	  closing	  the	  remaining	  Chernobyl	  units.	  Chernobyl-­‐1	  was	  closed	  in	  1996,	  Chernobyl-­‐3	  was	  closed	  in	  2000,	  while	  both	  Khmelnitski-­‐2	  and	  Rovno-­‐4	  came	  online	  first	  in	  2005.	  In	  the	  end,	  Ukraine	  funded	  most	  of	  the	  completion	  costs	  with	  local	  financing	  and	  bonds.86	  Since	  the	  completion	  of	  these	  plants,	  Ukraine	  has	  commissioned	  two	  more.	  Again,	  it	  appears	  that	  solid	  political	  support	  for	  nuclear,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  protest	  and	  change,	  is	  the	  main	  mechanism	  that	  kept	  nuclear	  power	  development	  going.	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  across	  the	  three	  cases,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  raw	  political	  opportunity	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  politicize	  nuclear	  power.	  This	  mechanism	  for	  long-­‐term	  nuclear	  power	  stagnation	  –	  politicization	  –	  is	  more	  complex,	  but	  no	  less	  vital,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  these	  three	  countries	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  context	  of	  established	  democracies.	  
	  
Ukraine,	  South	  Korea	  &	  Spain	  –	  Distinguishing	  Variables	  Historical	  Investment	  in	  Nuclear	  Power	  	   Previous	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  does	  not	  have	  explanatory	  power	  independently	  of	  other	  variables.	  In	  this	  group	  of	  cases	  the	  R&D	  funding	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  accidents	  in	  question	  was	  minimal	  –	  none	  of	  these	  countries	  began	  their	  programs	  with	  indigenous	  capacity.	  Rather,	  they	  imported	  reactors.	  The	  three	  countries	  also	  had	  remarkably	  similar	  capacity	  per	  capita	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  Looking	  from	  the	  sunk-­‐cost	  angle,	  however,	  interesting	  differences	  emerge	  between	  the	  countries	  in	  this	  group.	  	  The	  weight	  of	  previous	  investment	  on	  government	  decisions	  appears	  to	  have	  varied.	  Spain	  abandoned	  several	  nearly-­‐constructed	  nuclear	  plants	  in	  1982,	  which	  represented	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  government	  investment,87	  while	  South	  Korea	  did	  not	  come	  to	  consider	  abandoning	  plants	  and	  Ukraine	  campaigned	  hard	  against	  international	  pressure	  to	  maintain	  the	  Chernobyl	  plant	  operational	  for	  as	  long	  as	  possible.88	  	  Economic	  Dependence	  on	  Imported	  Fuel	  	   In	  contrast	  to	  our	  earlier	  group	  of	  countries,	  economic	  dependence	  on	  imported	  fuel	  does	  not	  have	  independent	  explanatory.	  Ukraine,	  of	  the	  three,	  is	  least	  dependent	  on	  imports	  as	  a	  fraction	  of	  total	  primary	  energy	  consumption	  by	  quite	  a	  large	  margin.	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  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  relevant	  decisions,	  Spain	  had	  similar	  dependence	  to	  South	  Korea.	  Observes	  noted	  in	  1992	  that	  "Instead	  of	  nuclear	  energy,	  the	  country	  plans	  to	  build	  a	  natural	  gas	  pipeline	  across	  the	  Straight	  of	  Gibraltar	  to	  bring	  Algerian	  gas	  to	  the	  Iberian	  Peninsula.”89	  The	  pipeline	  was	  subsequently	  built	  and	  began	  operating	  in	  1996.90	  The	  choice	  between	  importing	  fossil	  fuels	  and	  maintaining	  nuclear	  sources	  was	  clear.	  	  	   Dependence	  on	  energy	  imports	  is	  of	  supplementary	  explanatory	  value	  for	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Korea,	  which	  imported	  70%	  of	  its	  primary	  energy	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Chernobyl.91	  	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  	   Ukraine	  and	  South	  Korea	  had	  far	  lower	  GDP	  that	  Spain	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  and	  this	  has	  explanatory	  power.	  Although	  neither	  historical	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  power	  nor	  economic	  dependence	  on	  imported	  fuel	  had	  independent	  explanatory	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  power,	  they	  gain	  importance	  as	  variables	  through	  their	  interaction	  with	  GDP	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita92.	  	  
	  Having	  a	  lower	  GDP	  makes	  investments	  in	  nuclear	  energy	  larger	  relative	  to	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  may	  explain	  why	  Ukraine	  and	  South	  Korea	  were	  less	  receptive	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  abandoning	  nuclear	  plants.	  In	  these	  countries,	  the	  plants	  represented	  a	  larger	  investment	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state.	  Similarly,	  wealth	  may	  influence	  the	  perception	  of	  energy	  import	  dependence	  of	  a	  country.	  A	  richer	  country,	  in	  term	  of	  higher	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  will	  have	  more	  resources	  available	  with	  which	  to	  import	  energy.	  Energy	  dependence,	  therefore,	  may	  be	  less	  salient	  of	  an	  issue.	  	   Spain	  and	  Ukraine	  are	  directly	  comparable	  in	  their	  reaction	  to	  temporary	  moratoriums	  and	  the	  decisions	  made	  to	  keep	  or	  lift	  them.	  Spain	  imposed	  a	  moratorium	  on	  five	  plants	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  PEN-­‐1983.	  These	  five	  plants,	  moreover,	  were	  abandoned	  at	  an	  uncommonly	  advanced	  stage	  of	  construction	  (92%	  and	  50%	  completed	  in	  some	  cases)93	  thereby	  representing	  a	  sizeable	  investment	  on	  the	  part	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  The	  populations	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  are	  very	  similar.	  GDP	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita	  are	  equivalent	  indicators	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  analysis.	  	  93	  Paffenbarger	  and	  International	  Energy	  Agency,	  2001.	  Pg	  226.	  
GDP	  per	  Capita	  (current	  US$)	  Source:	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  
of	  the	  Spanish	  state	  –	  18.5%	  of	  their	  nuclear	  investment	  in	  1982.	  This	  appreciably	  changed	  energy	  investment	  patterns.94	  In	  Ukraine’s	  case,	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  placed	  all	  nuclear	  plants	  under	  construction	  at	  the	  time	  under	  moratorium	  in	  April	  of	  1990,	  notably	  before	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.95	  Similarly	  to	  Spain,	  construction	  stopped	  at	  an	  advanced	  stage,	  and	  represented	  a	  large	  investment.	  In	  Spain,	  the	  moratorium	  persisted	  until	  it	  became	  permanent	  law	  twelve	  years	  later.	  Ukraine’s	  moratorium,	  however,	  was	  lifted	  after	  only	  three	  years	  by	  the	  newly	  independent	  government	  -­‐	  even	  though	  Chernobyl-­‐2	  had	  caught	  fire,	  closing	  in	  1991,	  and	  the	  paused	  plants	  “faced	  enormous	  public	  opposition”.96	  The	  different	  economic	  situations	  have	  explanatory	  power	  over	  the	  difference	  in	  response.	  Ukraine	  began	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy	  at	  a	  lower	  starting	  point,	  relatively,	  in	  terms	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  and	  “NPPs	  were	  the	  most	  modern	  power	  sources”.97	  Ukraine’s	  economy	  collapsed	  almost	  entirely	  with	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  communist	  economic	  system,	  rendering	  organic	  fuel	  “scarce”.98	  	  Spain’s	  economy	  survived	  transition	  to	  democracy	  relatively	  unscathed.	  New	  independence	  brought	  economic	  problems	  to	  the	  fore,	  exacerbating	  the	  issue	  of	  foreign	  import	  dependence	  while	  enhancing	  the	  value	  to	  the	  state	  of	  previous	  investments	  in	  nuclear	  power.	  This	  combination	  of	  factors	  also	  helps	  explain	  why	  nuclear	  power	  received	  so	  little	  challenge	  on	  the	  larger	  political	  scene	  in	  South	  Korea.	  There,	  low	  GDP	  and	  high	  energy	  import	  dependence	  combined	  to	  insulate	  nuclear	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  central	  government.99	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Kolb,	  2007.	  Pg	  266.	  95	  WNIR,	  1992.	  Pg	  13.	  96	  WNIR,	  1992.	  Pg	  8.	  &	  Rüdig,	  1990.	  Pg	  226-­‐227.	  	  97	  Ibid.	  Pg	  285.	  	  98	  Kokhan,	  I.V.,	  and	  V.J	  Zeniuk	  “Current	  Status	  and	  Perspctives	  of	  Atomic	  Energy	  Development	  in	  Ukraine”.	  Power	  in	  Developing	  Countries:	  Its	  Potential	  Role	  and	  
Strategies	  for	  Its	  Development.	  Bhabha	  Atomic	  Research	  Centre,	  Mumbai,	  India.	  Vienna:	  IAEA,	  2000.	  285-­‐290	  Web.	  Nov.	  2013.	  Pg	  285.	  99	  There	  were	  several	  local	  demonstrations	  between	  1988	  and	  1990,	  at	  the	  Kori	  facility	  and	  new	  potential	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  sites.	  The	  potential	  for	  political	  impact	  was	  there,	  but	  these	  protests	  remained	  entirely	  local	  in	  character.	  [WNIR,	  1992.	  &	  Paffenbarger	  and	  IEA,	  2001.	  Pg	  256.]	  The	  combination	  of	  low	  GDP	  and	  high	  energy	  import	  dependence	  apparently	  made	  opposing	  nuclear	  power	  an	  unappealing	  option	  for	  the	  government,	  even	  given	  the	  opportunity	  for	  political	  gains.	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   When	  allowed	  to	  interact	  with	  GDP	  both	  historical	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  power	  and	  economic	  dependence	  on	  imported	  fuel	  have	  explanatory	  power.	  	  	  Regime	  Type	  	  	   All	  three	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  this	  set	  of	  cases	  went	  through	  a	  period	  of	  transition	  to	  democracy	  during	  the	  time	  where	  the	  most	  lasting	  decisions	  regarding	  nuclear	  power	  were	  made.	  The	  type	  of	  regime	  from	  which	  the	  transition	  occurred	  does	  not	  have	  explanatory	  power.	  Spain	  and	  South	  Korea	  were	  the	  most	  similar	  in	  that	  a	  military-­‐backed	  strongman	  had	  held	  power	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  before	  the	  transition	  took	  place.	  No	  country	  had	  a	  transition	  remarkably	  more	  tumultuous	  than	  the	  others.	  	  There	  exists	  a	  time-­‐relative	  difference	  that	  one	  cannot	  rule	  out	  as	  important,	  however.	  In	  Spain,	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy	  definitively	  began	  before	  any	  of	  the	  major	  nuclear	  accidents.	  Massive	  anti-­‐nuclear	  protests	  rocked	  Bilbao	  as	  early	  as	  1977.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  Basque	  nationalists	  at	  promoting	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  cause,	  even	  in	  its	  infancy	  when	  the	  movement	  was	  emerging	  and	  based	  on	  largely	  theoretical	  dangers	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  ensured	  that	  it	  was	  a	  national	  political	  issue	  
before	  Three	  Mile	  Island.	  In	  the	  other	  two	  countries	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy	  truly	  took	  hold	  after	  Chernobyl,	  but	  was	  underway	  in	  one	  form	  or	  another	  before	  1986.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Ukraine,	  while	  still	  a	  part	  of	  the	  USSR,	  the	  liberalizing	  reforms	  of	  Gorbachev	  were	  begun	  before	  Chernobyl.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Korea,	  political	  turmoil,	  including	  pro-­‐democratic	  protests,	  followed	  the	  assassination	  Park	  Chung-­‐hee	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  military	  government	  in	  1979.	  	  In	  neither	  case	  was	  this	  political	  opportunity	  early	  enough	  in	  history	  to	  parallel	  the	  Spanish	  case.	  It	  is	  possible,	  given	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  politicization	  mechanism	  in	  making	  permanent	  anti-­‐nuclear	  decisions,	  that	  transitions	  to	  democracy	  have	  greater	  potential	  to	  impact	  nuclear	  development	  when	  they	  occur	  before	  large-­‐scale	  accidents,	  rather	  than	  during	  or	  after.	  Particularly,	  political	  parties	  who	  are	  official	  at	  the	  time	  of	  an	  accident	  might	  face	  more	  pressure	  to	  adopt	  and	  keep	  anti-­‐nuclear	  party	  platforms	  than	  parties	  emerging	  in	  the	  years	  following	  one.	  In	  South	  Korea	  and	  Ukraine	  political	  parties	  competitive	  to	  the	  regime	  emerged	  at	  a	  later	  time.	  
While	  possible,	  several	  elements	  make	  the	  argument	  supporting	  this	  variable	  less	  than	  fully	  convincing.	  Specifically,	  in	  Spain	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  movement	  first	  allied	  with	  regionalist	  factions,	  not	  legitimate	  political	  parties	  –	  the	  politicization	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this.	  Particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Ukraine,	  there	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  some	  similar	  overlap	  between	  the	  goals	  of	  independence	  activists	  and	  anti-­‐nuclear	  activists.	  If	  such	  an	  alliance	  did	  not	  emerge	  right	  after	  Chernobyl	  while	  anti-­‐nuclear	  opinions	  were	  intense,	  it	  seems	  less	  likely	  –	  not	  more	  –	  that	  such	  an	  alliance	  would	  have	  formed	  in	  the	  largely	  ambivalent	  atmosphere	  beforehand,	  as	  it	  did	  in	  Spain.	  This	  reasoning	  applies	  equally	  well	  to	  other	  potential	  political	  alliances	  and	  to	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Korea.	  We	  may	  also	  be	  running	  up	  against	  a	  selection	  bias,	  as	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  such	  alliances	  were	  attempted	  in	  Ukraine	  but	  unsuccessful	  for	  other	  reasons.	  	  Regime	  type	  does	  not	  have	  explanatory	  power,	  and	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy	  (as	  it	  applies	  to	  the	  level	  of	  establishment	  of	  political	  parties)	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  accident	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  relevant.	  More	  convincing,	  in	  any	  case,	  are	  variables	  that	  offer	  an	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  the	  political	  alliance	  occurred	  in	  Spain	  or	  why	  it	  was	  so	  successful	  at	  affecting	  national	  politics.	  	  Government	  Structure	  	   From	  the	  previous	  group	  of	  cases,	  the	  federal	  nature	  of	  the	  German	  government	  carries	  explanatory	  power,	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  unitary	  states	  France	  and	  Japan.	  Spain,	  Ukraine,	  and	  South	  Korea	  are	  all	  unitary	  states.	  However,	  Spain	  has	  an	  established	  regionalist	  history	  and	  is	  significantly	  less	  centralized.	  Although	  not	  a	  federal	  state,	  the	  Spanish	  constitution	  (1978)	  gives	  substantial	  governing	  leeway	  to	  its	  seventeen	  “autonomous	  communities”.100	  Ukraine	  and	  South	  Korea	  have	  one	  small	  region	  each	  with	  greater	  autonomy.	  Spanish	  regionalism,	  then,	  is	  similar	  in	  some	  respects	  to	  German	  federalism.	  We	  have	  seen,	  however,	  that	  the	  regulatory	  mechanism	  was	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  three	  cases	  considered	  here,	  as	  none	  of	  the	  countries	  had	  regulatory	  systems	  that	  responded	  to	  public	  pressure.	  Instead,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  They	  are	  the	  corresponding	  Spanish	  structure	  to	  a	  region	  or	  state.	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency.	  "Spain."	  cia.gov.	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  n.d.	  Web.	  13	  Apr.	  2014.	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  Spanish	  regionalism	  led	  directly	  to	  activating	  the	  politicization	  mechanism	  by	  helping	  the	  nuclear	  issue	  echo	  onto	  the	  national	  stage.	  This	  lends	  strong	  support	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  decentralized	  government	  (i.e.	  federalism	  or	  regionalism)	  has	  an	  indirect	  influence	  on	  the	  politicization	  mechanism.	  Earlier,	  this	  was	  considered	  of	  potential	  relevance	  in	  Germany.	  This	  group	  of	  case	  studies,	  then,	  reiterates	  the	  advantage	  of	  a	  centralized	  unitary	  state	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  federal	  or	  highly	  decentralized	  state	  –	  in	  maintaining	  nuclear	  development	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  a	  large-­‐scale	  accident.	  	  Centralization	  of	  the	  Nuclear	  Industry	  	   The	  nuclear	  industry	  was	  centralized,	  to	  a	  great	  extent,	  in	  all	  three	  countries.	  Regional	  electricity	  companies	  in	  South	  Korea	  consolidated	  together	  into	  one	  company	  as	  early	  as	  1961.	  Nuclear	  research	  and	  development	  efforts	  were	  also	  highly	  centralized,	  under	  the	  Office	  of	  Atomic	  Energy.101	  Ukraine	  has	  a	  designated	  and	  state-­‐owned	  nuclear	  power	  utility,	  Energoatom.102	  In	  Spain,	  a	  state-­‐owned	  company,	  ENUSA,	  has	  run	  all	  nuclear	  front-­‐end	  activities	  since	  1972.	  Ownership	  and	  operation	  of	  nuclear	  power	  was	  carried	  out	  mainly	  by	  the	  state-­‐owned	  Empresa	  
Nacional	  de	  Electricidad	  S.A	  (later	  renamed	  Endesa)	  and	  Iberduero	  (later	  Iberdrola).103	  Spain’s	  licensing	  system	  was	  also	  highly	  centralized,	  offering	  “no	  practical	  chances	  of	  challenging	  these	  decisions	  effectively	  within	  licensing	  procedures	  or	  courts.”104	  	  Mandate	  of	  the	  Ruling	  Government	  	   As	  these	  three	  countries	  transitioned	  toward	  democracy	  they	  experienced	  tumultuous	  political	  changes.	  In	  Spain,	  the	  ruling	  political	  party	  in	  1980	  existed	  only	  between	  1977	  and	  1983.	  In	  South	  Korea,	  the	  first	  democratic	  elections	  were	  very	  close.	  In	  Ukraine,	  the	  political	  scene	  was	  rapidly	  shifting	  as	  political	  parties	  formed	  and	  political	  structures	  evolved.	  In	  no	  case	  was	  there	  a	  clear	  mandate	  for	  the	  ruling	  government	  during	  the	  relevant	  time	  period.	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Access	  to	  Credit	  Access	  to	  credit	  in	  an	  immediate	  sense,	  namely	  inflation	  and	  interest	  rates,	  was	  earlier	  discounted	  as	  a	  significant	  variable	  among	  our	  stable	  democracies.105	  Transitions	  to	  democracy	  and	  the	  accompanying	  political	  instability	  might	  well	  add	  impediments	  to	  finding	  financing,	  and	  variation	  therein.	  This	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  causal	  relevance,	  however.	  Ukraine	  illustrates	  this	  point	  nicely,	  in	  that	  it	  faced	  large	  challenges	  in	  finding	  the	  financing	  to	  complete	  Khmelnitski-­‐2	  and	  Ronvo-­‐4	  in	  the	  1990s	  but	  managed	  to	  do	  so,	  anyway.	  Ukraine	  sought	  loans	  from	  both	  the	  EU	  (specifically	  the	  European	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  &	  Development	  and	  the	  European	  Commission)	  and	  Russia.	  These	  loans	  came	  with	  such	  restrictions,	  however,	  that	  Ukraine	  proceeded	  “with	  local	  finance	  and	  a	  bond	  issue”.106	  Scaled-­‐down	  loans	  from	  the	  international	  players	  eventually	  played	  a	  role,	  as	  well.	  Despite	  the	  financing	  difficulties	  of	  transitioning	  to	  a	  market	  economy,	  and	  the	  outright	  refusal	  of	  large	  international	  loans,	  Ukraine	  was	  able	  to	  finance	  the	  completion	  of	  these	  two	  units.	  As	  the	  other	  two	  countries	  faced	  far	  less	  intense	  financial	  challenges,	  the	  success	  of	  Ukraine	  shows	  that	  access	  to	  credit	  may	  be	  discounted	  as	  a	  relevant	  variable	  in	  this	  group	  of	  cases.	  	  Rate	  of	  Growth	  of	  Electricity	  Consumption	  	  	   The	  case	  of	  Ukraine	  is	  a	  direct	  refutation	  of	  this	  variable.	  Concerning	  the	  two	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  that	  have	  entered	  operation	  in	  Ukraine	  since	  Chernobyl:	  “Khmelnitsky-­‐2	  and	  Rovno-­‐4	  reactors…	  began	  operating	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2004	  and	  were	  said	  to	  be	  the	  replacement	  reactors	  for	  the	  remaining	  Chernobyl	  units	  closed	  by	  2000.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  economic	  decline	  in	  the	  country	  during	  the	  early	  1990s	  Ukraine's	  peak	  demand,	  when	  construction	  was	  restarted	  in	  1995,	  was	  around	  30,000	  MW,	  with	  an	  installed	  capacity	  of	  around	  54,000	  MW	  and	  thus	  there	  is	  substantial	  reserve	  capacity,	  about	  80%,	  or	  over	  twenty	  times	  the	  operational	  capacity	  of	  Chernobyl."	  Ukraine’s	  electricity	  consumption	  had	  gone	  down	  significantly	  in	  recent	  years,	  yet	  they	  still	  built	  nuclear	  capacity	  soon	  after	  Chernobyl.	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ABRUPT	  CHANGES	  IN	  NUCLEAR	  POWER	  DEVELOPMENT	   37	  	   High	  rates	  of	  electricity	  growth	  may	  be	  of	  supplementary	  importance,	  however.	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  Spain	  explicitly	  considered	  its	  1984	  electricity	  growth	  in	  the	  context	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  and	  found	  it	  not	  rapid	  enough	  to	  warrant	  licensing	  new	  nuclear	  power	  pants.107	  Electricity	  growth	  rebounded	  in	  the	  1990s,	  however,	  with	  no	  impact	  on	  nuclear	  policy.	  Spain	  was	  willing	  to	  build	  coal	  plants,	  combined	  cycle	  plants	  and	  a	  natural	  gas	  pipeline	  to	  Algeria	  to	  meet	  the	  growth	  in	  electricity	  demand.	  	  A	  high	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  electricity	  consumption	  could	  be	  a	  supplementary	  variable	  for	  South	  Korea,	  although	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  electricity	  consumption	  would	  have	  an	  effect	  isolated	  to	  nuclear	  power.	  	  	  Level	  of	  knowledge	  of	  Nuclear	  Power	  	   Ignorance	  about	  nuclear	  power	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  correlate	  with	  lower	  rates	  of	  acceptance	  of	  nuclear	  energy.108	  In	  the	  context	  of	  these	  three	  countries	  the	  causal	  relevance	  of	  this	  observation	  appear	  limited.	  The	  populations	  of	  South	  Korea	  and	  Ukraine	  likely	  knew	  less	  technical	  details	  about	  nuclear	  power,	  and	  direct	  public	  influence	  on	  policy	  was	  limited,	  anyway.	  	  Conclusion	  From	  this	  analysis,	  we	  have	  found	  the	  most	  important	  variables	  affecting	  enduring	  change	  in	  nuclear	  power	  development	  after	  an	  accident,	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  they	  act,	  for	  less	  politically	  stable	  countries	  with	  an	  emerging	  nuclear	  program.	  The	  most	  important	  mechanism	  through	  which	  a	  nuclear	  program	  stagnates	  was,	  again,	  found	  to	  be	  the	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  power	  on	  the	  national	  stage,	  specifically	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  anti-­‐nuclear	  views	  in	  national	  party	  platforms.	  This	  mechanism	  was	  activated	  in	  Spain	  in	  response	  to	  Three	  Mile	  Island,	  but	  was	  not	  activated	  in	  South	  Korea	  or	  Ukraine.	  Combinations	  of	  variables	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  this	  group	  of	  cases.	  Low	  GDP	  has	  clear	  explanatory	  power	  over	  the	  difference	  in	  mechanism	  activation,	  particularly	  through	  interaction	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with	  significant	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  power	  and	  dependence	  on	  energy	  imports.	  In	  echo	  of	  our	  findings	  for	  the	  previous	  group	  of	  cases,	  a	  decentralized	  government	  structure	  also	  has	  clear	  explanatory	  power.	  Of	  supplementary	  relevance	  may	  be	  a	  high	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  electricity	  consumption	  in	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Korea,	  and	  a	  relatively	  early	  start	  to	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Spain.	  	  
Conclusion	  This	  thesis	  posed	  the	  question:	  Why	  do	  large	  nuclear	  accidents	  derail	  plans	  for	  nuclear	  power	  in	  some	  countries	  and	  not	  others?	  It	  has	  provided	  answers	  through	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  two	  matched	  sets	  of	  cases.	  Three	  major	  nuclear	  countries	  –	  consisting	  of	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  Japan	  –	  formed	  one	  comparison	  set	  as	  nuclear	  power	  development	  stagnated	  in	  Germany,	  but	  not	  in	  France	  or	  Japan.	  Three	  countries	  with	  significant	  but	  smaller	  nuclear	  programs	  at	  the	  time	  –	  consisting	  of	  South	  Korea,	  Spain,	  and	  Ukraine	  –	  formed	  a	  second	  comparison	  set	  as	  nuclear	  power	  development	  stagnated	  in	  Spain,	  but	  not	  in	  South	  Korea	  or	  Ukraine.	  Crucial	  to	  understanding	  differences	  between	  the	  countries	  was	  to	  first	  isolate	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  reactions	  to	  accidents	  cause	  dramatic	  and	  enduring	  reductions	  of	  plans	  for	  nuclear	  power.	  More	  specifically,	  what	  mechanisms	  caused	  flips	  from	  positive	  feedback	  to	  negative	  feedback	  situations	  in	  the	  nuclear	  programs	  of	  Spain	  and	  Germany?	  A	  pervasive	  conventional	  explanation	  holds	  that	  nuclear	  accidents	  expose	  the	  dangers	  of	  nuclear	  power	  and	  convince	  rational	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  publics.	  This	  explanation	  was	  considered	  independently,	  through	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  risks	  of	  nuclear	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  fatalities	  and	  economic	  cost.	  We	  found	  that	  dry	  rationality	  about	  risk	  on	  the	  part	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  cannot	  explain	  curtailment	  of	  nuclear	  programs	  because	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  nuclear	  power	  generation	  that	  goes	  offline	  or	  remains	  unconstructed	  is	  replaced	  by	  coal.	  Risk	  from	  nuclear	  and	  coal	  power	  are	  directly	  comparable	  across	  severe	  accident	  risk,	  routine	  operating	  risk,	  latent	  public	  risk,	  and	  economic	  cost.	  Nuclear	  power	  is	  considerably	  less	  dangerous	  on	  every	  count.	  Additionally,	  neither	  natural	  gas	  nor	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  produce	  electricity	  with	  risks	  quantifiably	  lower	  than	  nuclear.	  	  More	  fruitful	  was	  to	  analyze	  through	  process	  tracing	  what	  specific	  attributes	  of	  a	  country’s	  reaction	  to	  accidents	  lead	  to	  long-­‐term	  reversals	  in	  nuclear	  power	  plans.	  Bringing	  together	  the	  historical	  analysis	  of	  France,	  Germany	  and	  Japan	  resulted	  in	  a	  clear	  yet	  nuanced	  picture	  for	  established	  democracies	  with	  large	  nuclear	  programs.	  The	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  power	  in	  national	  party	  politics	  stood	  out	  as	  a	  powerful	  mechanism	  determining	  the	  course	  of	  nuclear	  power	  
development	  over	  decades.	  Inconsistency	  within	  the	  nuclear	  regulatory	  system	  was	  a	  secondary	  mechanism.	  Both	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  were	  activated	  in	  Germany	  in	  response	  to	  Chernobyl,	  and	  neither	  was	  activated	  in	  France	  or	  Japan.	  Spain,	  Ukraine,	  and	  South	  Korea	  were	  all	  engaged	  in	  a	  transition	  to	  democracy	  around	  the	  relevant	  time	  period,	  which	  complicated	  the	  policy	  space	  in	  which	  decisions	  were	  made.	  The	  most	  important	  mechanism	  was,	  again,	  found	  to	  be	  the	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  power	  on	  the	  national	  stage,	  specifically	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  anti-­‐nuclear	  views	  in	  national	  party	  platforms.	  This	  mechanism	  was	  activated	  in	  Spain	  in	  response	  to	  Three	  Mile	  Island,	  but	  was	  not	  activated	  in	  South	  Korea	  or	  Ukraine.	  	  Armed	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  reversals	  came	  to	  take	  place,	  countries	  within	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  cases	  were	  be	  compared	  for	  the	  underlying	  differences	  that	  cause	  variation	  among	  them.	  	  Specifically,	  which	  attributes	  of	  the	  state	  and	  government	  determine	  whether	  the	  above	  mechanisms	  become	  activated	  in	  a	  given	  country,	  in	  response	  to	  an	  accident?	  For	  established	  democracies	  with	  large	  nuclear	  programs	  dependence	  on	  energy	  imports	  and	  level	  of	  federalization	  of	  the	  government	  have	  clear	  explanatory	  power.	  Of	  supplementary	  relevance	  may	  be	  a	  highly	  centralized	  or	  state-­‐controlled	  utility,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  France,	  and	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  current	  government,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan.	  For	  less	  politically	  stable	  countries	  with	  an	  emerging	  nuclear	  program	  combinations	  of	  variables	  played	  a	  larger	  role.	  Low	  GDP	  has	  clear	  explanatory	  power	  over	  the	  difference	  in	  mechanism	  activation,	  particularly	  through	  interaction	  with	  prior	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  power	  and	  dependence	  on	  energy	  imports.	  In	  echo	  of	  our	  findings	  for	  the	  previous	  group	  of	  cases,	  a	  decentralized	  government	  structure	  has	  clear	  explanatory	  power.	  Of	  supplementary	  relevance	  may	  be	  a	  high	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  electricity	  consumption	  in	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Korea,	  and	  a	  relatively	  early	  start	  to	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Spain.	  	  Across	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  cases,	  two	  elements	  of	  the	  state	  appear	  most	  important	  in	  determining	  the	  prospect	  of	  long-­‐term	  reversals	  in	  nuclear	  power	  plans:	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  issues	  of	  energy	  import	  dependence,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  centralization	  of	  the	  state	  government.	  Vulnerability	  to	  issues	  of	  energy	  import	  dependence,	  exacerbated	  by	  a	  low	  GDP,	  lessen	  the	  possibility	  of	  activating	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  the	  politicization	  mechanism.	  A	  federal	  or	  highly	  decentralized	  state	  heightens	  the	  possibility	  of	  activating	  the	  politicization	  mechanism	  and	  also	  makes	  an	  inconsistent	  regulatory	  system	  (the	  second	  mechanism	  discouraging	  nuclear	  power	  development)	  more	  likely.	  On	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  other	  variables	  that	  directly	  impact	  these	  mechanisms	  are	  supplementary,	  but	  still	  relevant.	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